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Articles
REBUILDING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
Merritt E. McAlister
ABSTRACT—The conversation about Supreme Court reform—as important
as it is—has obscured another, equally important conversation: the need for
lower federal court reform. The U.S. Courts of Appeals have not seen their
ranks grow in over three decades. Even then, those additions were stopgap
measures built on an appellate triage system that had outsourced much of its
work to nonjudicial decision-makers (central judicial staff and law clerks).
Those changes born of necessity have now become core features of the
federal appellate system, which distributes judicial resources—including
oral argument and judicial scrutiny—to a select few. This Article begins to
reimagine the courts in a time of surplus, not scarcity, and it offers a
comprehensive framework for identifying why, where, and how to add
judges to the federal appellate courts.
The existing distribution of judicial resources has created a problem:
the courts have relied too much on procedural shortcuts that permit them to
be highly selective in deciding which cases receive careful judicial attention.
Ultimately, the distribution of appellate resources has been uneven across
the country in ways that have a disparate impact on communities of color
and poor communities.
To redress these systemic deficits, this Article urges Congress to engage
in lower court reform by adding judges to the most underresourced federal
appellate courts. In so doing, it offers a framework for identifying
underresourced courts that would ensure periodic and consistent
congressional review of judicial needs. These measures consider indicia of
overdelegation, population growth, and caseload demands—all while
incentivizing courts not to overrely on procedural shortcuts in the first place.
AUTHOR—Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College
of Law. This work benefited from the thoughtful engagement of participants
at faculty workshops at the University of Florida Levin College of Law,
Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, and Northwestern
Pritzker School of Law; and at the 2020 Duke Law Judicial
Administration/Judicial Process Roundtable, the 2021 Southeastern
Association of Law Schools Annual Conference, the 2021 Civil Procedure
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Virtual Roundtable Workshop, and the 2021 Richmond Junior Faculty
Forum. I am grateful to Seth Endo, Dan Epps, Andrew Hammond, Jason
Nance, Rigel Oliveri, Judith Resnik, and Xiao Wang who read and improved
earlier drafts. I thank Zach Clopton, Myriam Gilles, Marin Levy, Maya Sen,
and Steve Vladeck for conversations that deepened and refined my approach
to court reform. I appreciate the diligent and careful work of the editors of
the Northwestern University Law Review for improving this work
enormously. For excellent research assistance, I thank Jordan Grana. All
mistakes, errors, and omissions that remain are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Debates about Supreme Court reform1—as needed as they are—have
overshadowed what is happening (and has been happening for decades) in

1 See, e.g., Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148,
169 (2019) (arguing that significant reform is required to save the Supreme Court); Opinion, How to Fix
the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/
opinion/supreme-court-reform.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2021) (compiling arguments for and against
reforming the federal courts).
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the lower federal courts. 2 The Supreme Court receives a disproportionate
amount of attention in modern court-reform debates.3 It is the rare federal
case that makes its way to the Supreme Court; most cases draw their last
breath in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. And most of these appeals are both
utterly ordinary—in the sense that they do not involve the kinds of novel,
contentious questions that make Supreme Court review likely—and also
profoundly important to the individuals who litigate them.4 These are direct
criminal appeals, prisoner and nonprisoner civil rights claims, habeas corpus
petitions, Social Security disability appeals, and immigration and asylum
appeals.5 Many of these appeals involve pro se appellants, as almost half of
all appeals do.6 In most circuits, these cases—whether lawyered or not—are
the great bulk of the work before each court every year. The courts of
appeals, moreover, defer to lower court decisions in these ordinary appeals

2 See, e.g., Leah Litman, Expand the Lower Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/expand-federal-courts-judges.html#litman [https://perma.
cc/XA3H-M53Q] (stating that the vast majority of cases do not reach the Supreme Court but are instead
resolved in the lower courts, and advocating for lower federal court reform); Xiao Wang, In Defense of
(Circuit) Court-Packing, 119 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 33 (2020), https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=mlr_online [https://perma.cc/L3JU-LWUC] (explaining that
federal “circuit courts are actually the last resort for most litigants” and advocating for lower federal court
reform).
3 The same could be said of the study of federal courts more generally. See, e.g., Justin WeinsteinTull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1039–40 (2020) (observing that litigants
filed 86.2 million cases in nonfederal courts in 2015 and only 343,176 cases in federal courts).
4 Professors Daniel Epps and William Ortman have argued that the “legal system would benefit if,
every Term, the Supreme Court were forced to decide some unquestionably unimportant cases—some
run-of-the-mill appeals dealing with the kinds of ordinary and seemingly inconsequential legal questions
that the lower courts resolve every day.” Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 705, 707 (2018). The very ordinariness of many of these cases, combined with the Supreme
Court’s obsessive focus on circuit splits, has created an accountability gap insulating many—if not most—
court of appeals decisions from the possibility of Supreme Court review. Id. at 721–23 (explaining how
“sharply circumscribed” the Supreme Court’s ability to monitor output of the circuit courts is under
current certiorari process).
5 See infra Appendix A (identifying the docket composition of the U.S. Courts of Appeals). Social
Security and immigration appeals fall within the broad category of administrative appeals; habeas corpus
and prisoner civil rights claims are within the categories of U.S. and private prisoner claims.
6 See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-9 (2021) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b9_0930.2020.
pdf [https://perma.cc/W2PC-9BUJ]. I rely heavily on data from several installments of Judicial Business
in this Article, which for convenience are cited simply as “JUDICIAL BUSINESS [year],” with a hyperlink
to each table the first time it appears. For all reports, see Judicial Business of the United States Courts,
U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-statescourts [https://perma.cc/8XLG-AMY4]. Note that the reporting period for the Administrative Office’s
Judicial Business publication runs from October 1 to September 30 each year. Id.
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in which oral argument is rare, decisions are poorly reasoned and recycled,
and judicial attention is scarce.7
Within each of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, there are (at least8) two tiers
of appellate procedure.9 The first tier is the traditional one, with an Article
III judge reading briefs, hearing oral argument, and working on an opinion
with her law clerks. The second tier, however, involves mostly nonjudicial
decision-makers. Every circuit employs central staff attorneys who process,
handle, and (essentially) decide large numbers of appeals with varying
degrees of judicial oversight.10 These cases rarely receive oral argument, and
they almost always end in nonprecedential or unpublished decisions. 11
Certain classes of appeals—especially those involving pro se litigants—go
through this second-tier process by default.12 In many circuits, the central
staff themselves are responsible for “screening” cases to determine whether
an appeal should receive first-tier or second-tier attention.13
The federal appellate courts’ distribution of resources through the
tiering of judicial time and attention is a “triage” system supposedly born of
necessity. Beginning in the 1960s, the federal appellate courts unilaterally
created shortcut procedures to handle what they perceived as a flood of new

7 See infra Section I.A (discussing the distribution of federal appellate resources); see also Judith
Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 840–44 (1984) (exploring procedure’s “value-expressive
functions” and identifying methods of process that preserve lower court decisions out of concerns about
resource conservation for habeas corpus petitions, civil rights claims, and employment law claims).
8 I have previously suggested that there may be three tiers of appellate process. See Merritt E.
McAlister, Missing Decisions, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1101, 1118 (2021). Further, some circuits (such as the
Ninth Circuit) have erected tiers within tiers by identifying cases within each tier that need a harder look
than others. See, e.g., J. Clifford Wallace, Improving the Appellate Process Worldwide Through
Maximizing Judicial Resources, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 187, 197 (2005) (discussing how
nonjudicial personnel screen and weigh cases—at least in the Ninth Circuit—according to relative
difficulty, “to apportion [the court’s] workload more equally among judges”).
9 Part I will describe these tiers, and the triage system that sorts cases into tiers, in detail. Although
the courts themselves acknowledge having argument and nonargument tracks for cases, see, e.g., 2D CIR.
LOC. R. 34.2 (listing the classes of cases subject to the court’s nonargument calendar), my use of the term
“tiers” reflects the scholarly consensus as to the effect of the courts’ procedural shifts over the last halfcentury at the federal appellate level. See generally infra Section I.A (describing procedures and tiers of
federal appellate process).
10 For an extended examination of the staff-attorney position across circuits, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, REFORMING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: MY FORMER COURT NEEDS TO OVERHAUL ITS STAFF
ATTORNEY PROGRAM AND BEGIN TELEVISING ITS ORAL ARGUMENTS 49–61 (2017).
11 Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How Judges
Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 416 (2013)
[hereinafter Levy, Judicial Attention] (“[C]ases that are not scheduled for oral argument tend to be
prepared by staff attorneys, and those same cases almost always result in unpublished dispositions.”).
12 See id. at 416–19 (discussing categorical presumptions that drive tracking decisions).
13 See POSNER, supra note 10, at 164–65 (identifying similarities and differences across circuits in
the use of staff attorneys).
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appeals outpacing the addition of new judges.14 Much of that flood involved
work of a particular kind: these were filings from prisoners, criminal
defendants, and civil rights claimants seeking to vindicate new statutory
rights and newly articulated constitutional rights.15 This created what some
viewed as a “crisis of volume,”16 but it was a crisis involving low-value or
“peculiarly undeserving”17 and less meritorious18 appeals. As such, Article
III judges decided this work needed less of their time and attention. The
courts therefore created a second-tier appellate process—staffed with
nonjudges—to help them handle the crisis.
These trends happened across all federal courts—and not just at the
appellate level. As Professor Judith Resnik observed in 1984, federal courts
innovated (lesser) procedures to handle low-value district court cases such
as habeas corpus petitions, civil rights claims, and employment law matters.19
Congress added magistrate judges to handle increased volume instead of
growing the ranks of Article III judges to carry that work.20 Professor Resnik
argued that these procedural choices reflected value judgments that
“embod[y] deeply held, albeit often unarticulated, views of human
relationships, of the importance and difficulty of passing judgments on
individuals’ conduct, and of the place of government in citizens’ lives.”21
Her observations hold true in other spaces within the federal judiciary; as
this Article seeks to demonstrate, the “value-expressive function[]”22 of the
shortcut procedures I detail here have now become firmly entrenched at the
federal appellate courts.

14 See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS, at xii, 115 (2013) (describing changes in appellate court structure
and case processing as “judicial activism of the highest order” and concluding that this “unilateral change
in [their] function . . . is deeply subversive of the entire constitutional scheme”).
15 For a discussion of the history of this caseload growth, see Penelope Pether, Inequitable
Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1444 & n.30
(2004).
16 See, e.g., Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1112 & n.9 (2011) (tracing
origins of the “crisis of volume” narrative (citing Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the
Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 642 (1974))).
17 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536–37 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the judgment).
18 See Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 181–82
(1999).
19 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 7, at 843, 939–64 (documenting procedural shifts in district courts
for resolving large volumes of habeas corpus petitions, civil rights claims, and employment law matters).
20 The magistrate system began in 1968 with the Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578,
§ 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). See
generally Peter G. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 344 (1979)
(describing the history of the federal magistrates).
21 Resnik, supra note 7, at 840.
22 Id. at 841.
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In whatever way it’s sliced or diced, the triage system is fundamentally
unequal as a matter of distributive justice.23 Perhaps because the courts have
been somewhat shameless in defending their system,24 I am certainly not the
first to call attention to its injustice. The late scholar Penelope Pether
observed more than a decade ago: “[T]he appeals court processes themselves
seem to place almost no priority on ‘justice.’” 25 Not long thereafter,
Professors William Richman and William Reynolds—the most prolific
scholars on what I describe here as the second tier of the federal appellate
system—wrote a capstone entitled Injustice on Appeal about the
transformation they had observed over their careers.26
Nevertheless, the distribution of appellate resources has become firmly
entrenched—so much so, in fact, that the tiers of appellate review appear
impervious to the steady reduction in appellate courts’ caseloads since the
early 2000s. 27 To the extent that triage procedures are those deployed to
tackle emergencies, one might have expected courts to rely less on shortcuts
when the emergency they faced was no more. That has not happened. Courts,
it appears, have not recalibrated in response to lessening demands on their
time as their caseload volume has receded. On average, they issue more
unpublished decisions today and hear fewer oral arguments than they did
fifteen years ago when they saw, nationally, nearly 20,000 more appeals.28
The triage system has taken on a life of its own.
My use of the term “distributive justice” borrows from Professor Matthew Shapiro’s recent work
to identify “which specific goods access to justice actually comprises.” Matthew A. Shapiro, Distributing
Civil Justice, 109 GEO. L.J. 1473, 1477 (2021). Professor Shapiro categorizes access to “judicial
resources” as one of the goods to be distributed in a civil justice system and observes that judicial
decisions to allocate time and attention differentially may be seen both “as a form of disparate treatment”
and “disparate impact,” depending on the circumstances. See id. at 1491–92 (discussing how “from an
access-to-justice perspective, the worry is that courts are giving certain categories of cases short shrift so
that they can focus on the ones that, from many judges’ perspectives, really matter”).
24 See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have Helped
Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 949 (1995) (“Judges have gone to great lengths to defend the
level of delegation that already has taken place.”).
25 Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish
U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 29 (2007).
26 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14; see also THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON
APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 14–30 (1994) (making similar observations
about the erosion of the “federal appellate tradition” and warning that such tradition may “disappear
altogether” without intervention).
27 See Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 118 MICH. L. REV. 533, 554 & fig.5 (2020) (discussing the lack of correlation
between use of unpublished decisions and overall caseload volume).
28 In the 2005 reporting year, in which the U.S. Courts of Appeals received 68,473 total filings (their
most ever), JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2005, at tbl.B-1, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
statistics_import_dir/b1_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C52K-XDYN], the nationwide unpublication rate was
23
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Let me make clear from the outset: I don’t argue that courts should
abandon all triage. I don’t believe that every appeal demands equal judicial
attention. Frivolous appeals, for example, certainly do not. But I do think
courts have developed a dependence on the shortcuts they developed for a
variety of human and institutional reasons—and that these entrenched habits
will likely be difficult to change. What may have once been a much-needed
efficiency has become an overused convenience that threatens to undermine
core distributive justice and day-in-court values. 29 There’s also reason to
worry that judicial inattention may cause particularly vulnerable litigants to
lose where more judicial attention (especially through appointed counsel and
oral argument) might detect error (or identify needed lawmaking).30
Determining the optimal level of triage is a very difficult task. It is a
question for which I do not have an answer. What I do argue, however, is
that under the existing scheme, we can’t ask very busy courts to do more
(e.g., write more precedential opinions and hold more oral argument) without
more help. The data discussed here indicate that courts will do more with
more judicial help. Not every court relies on shortcut procedures to the same
extent—as will be abundantly clear by the end of Part II—and one feature of
those courts that rely less on shortcuts is that they generally have fewer
appeals per judge. That is reason to believe that service-oriented courts might
more generously distribute their procedural goods (e.g., more oral argument
and more reasoned decision-making) when they have more judicial help to
do that work.
Central to my critique is the inexplicably uneven distribution of federal
judicial attention across the circuits. Courts utilize oral argument and
publication (or, really, unpublication) in different ways, despite sharing
similar formal rules. 31 These are disparities that our hierarchical judicial
system cannot fix—these are not the kinds of circuit splits that receive

81.6%, id. tbl.S-3, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/s3_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F572-72JH], and the nationwide oral-argument rate was 30.1%, id. tbl.S-1, https://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/s1_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FQQ-N8CZ]. In the
2020 reporting year, with more than 20,000 fewer filings, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-1, https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b1_0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S6H-2UGW]
(48,190 total filings), the nationwide unpublication rate was 87%, id. tbl.B-12, https://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/252V-ED5L], and
the oral-argument rate was 19.3%, id. tbl.B-10, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
jb_b10_0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C69-GXZ2].
29 See McAlister, supra note 27, at 583–94 (arguing that minimally reasoned unpublished
decisions—a product of second-tier review—threaten procedural justice values).
30 See infra Figure 2 (identifying strong correlation between rates of oral argument and favorable
outcomes on appeal).
31 See infra Section II.A (discussing the disparate use of shortcuts across appellate courts).
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Supreme Court review.32 But these differences across the circuits have both
a substantive effect—because there is a correlation between oral argument
and favorable results on appeal—and also an unintended consequence: the
existing two-tier system appears to disparately impact communities of color
and poor communities. The latter—the risk of disparate impact—should not
be terribly surprising given how and where these procedures began. Federal
courts in the Deep South (the old Fifth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit)
innovated procedural shortcuts, and they did so in response to concerns over
a growing docket of habeas corpus and prisoner civil rights claims.33 And
even when the Second Circuit began to loosen its strong tradition of holding
oral argument, it innovated a devoted nonargument track to handle a bevy of
immigration appeals in the wake of post-September 11 immigration
reforms.34 Second-tier procedures and their impact on vulnerable litigants
have always been linked. And they still are.
To the extent the triage process developed because demand (cases)
outpaced supply (judges), one obvious—albeit very difficult—solution to the
court’s workload problem would have been to add more judges. Dating back
to the 1990s, however, judges have been divided over whether the courts
should grow substantially or not. 35 Increasing the number of authorized
judgeships raises a number of challenges—especially for the manageability
of courts, including the ease of en banc review. This Article charts a middle
path—resisting both the urge to maintain the status quo and to double the
size of the federal judiciary. It proposes a framework for periodic,
predictable congressional review of judicial need based on a combination of
both endogenous and exogenous factors that would empower courts to
minimize disparities and reduce overreliance on nonjudicial decisionmakers.

32

Cf. SUP. CT. R. 10 (identifying considerations for Supreme Court review). At bottom, these
disparities defy Supreme Court review because that model of adjudication is case specific, whereas the
trends we see in how the courts deploy procedures operate systemically. The Court could influence trends
through its oversight of the rulemaking process or through the Judicial Conference.
33 See Pether, supra note 15, at 1445–46 (tracing the Fourth Circuit’s role in institutionalizing
nonpublication and that innovation’s connection to pro se prisoner litigation). Although some judges on
the old Fifth Circuit were hailed as heroes in the post-Brown Civil Rights Era, that court also innovated
summary procedures for many criminal and habeas corpus claims. See Charles R. Haworth, Screening
and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 257, 277–78
(discussing screening procedures for different types of cases).
34 See generally Jon O. Newman, The Second Circuit’s Expedited Adjudication of Asylum Cases: A
Case Study of a Judicial Response to an Unprecedented Problem of Caseload Management, 74 BROOK.
L. REV. 429, 430–34 (2008) (describing the development of the nonargument track for immigration
appeals).
35 See infra Section III.A (discussing disagreement among the federal bench).

1144

116:1137 (2022)

Rebuilding the Federal Circuit Courts

To be sure, any judicial expansion (no matter how modest) raises
serious political challenges that may be so fraught as to make this effort more
pipedream than reality.36 Given its political difficulty, some scholars have
turned to creative and more indirect alternatives. For example, Professor
Marin Levy’s recent work seeks to make the possibility of senior status for
federal appellate judges “more attractive, with the ultimate goal of creating
vacancies to provide more judge power to the federal judiciary.” 37 That
proposal has the substantial advantage of bypassing the sticky wicket of
Congress. But it offers only a partial solution to larger systemic problems
that individual or even collective judicial retirements alone cannot fix.
Professor Levy and I agree that the courts need to be “bigger.”38 I hope to
find a way to bring Congress into that conversation while reducing the
partisan concerns over judicial expansion. Although I do not wish to
minimize the real political challenges of any expansion proposal, those
challenges should not stop us from assessing judicial need. It should also not
stop us from critiquing the current pathway for making such
recommendations, which flows through the judiciary itself before reaching
Congress. When the courts do not ask Congress for more judges, it may be
easier to maintain the status quo and avoid the political thicket of court
expansion, however needed and however modest.39
And the courts, indeed, have largely defended the status quo. The U.S.
Courts of Appeals have not asked Congress for any meaningful number of
additional judges over the last decade. Indeed, recently the Ninth Circuit
asked Congress to create only an exceedingly modest number of additional

36

See Marin K. Levy, The Promise of Senior Judges, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1232–33 (2021)
[hereinafter Levy, Senior Judges] (arguing that there are “no easy fixes” to make federal appellate courts
bigger and advocating for lowering institutional barriers to taking senior status to increase judicial
resources); see also Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2403–07 (2014)
[hereinafter Levy, Judging] (arguing that expanding the federal appellate bench is an impractical solution
to the appellate courts’ workload problem).
37 Levy, Senior Judges, supra note 36, at 1235; see also David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Retaining
Life Tenure: The Case for a “Golden Parachute,” 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1397, 1400–02 (2005) (advocating
for retirement-benefit and other institutional reforms that might incentivize federal judges—in particular,
Supreme Court Justices—to retire at an appropriate age or should they become mentally or physically
disabled).
38 Levy, Senior Judges, supra note 36, at 1232 (stating that courts need to be bigger but recognizing
the political difficulty of adding judges and seeking to avoid partisanship that could impair the judiciary).
39 I also recognize that it’s just as possible that the courts have been reluctant to ask Congress for
more judges because they recognize the political difficulty of that task. But the debate over judicial
expansion discussed in Section III.B appears to run deeper than that and reflects concerns about the nature
of the federal judiciary that extend well beyond how it intersects with the political realm.
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judgeships (two, down from a request for five in 2019).40 Busier and equally
busy courts—the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, in particular—have
made no requests for additional judges; indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has
never done so.41 Today, the Eleventh Circuit sees about 500 more appeals
per year than the entire old Fifth Circuit saw in the year before Congress split
the Fifth Circuit into the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits.42 At that time, the
“jumbo” old Fifth Circuit had twenty-six judges. 43 Congress gave the
Eleventh Circuit twelve of those judges upon its creation, and at twelve
judges the Eleventh Circuit has remained, even though it now handles more
work than twenty-six judges together handled forty years ago.44
Why? Because that’s what a majority of the Eleventh Circuit’s judges
have seemingly wanted. Current frameworks for evaluating judicial need
begin with the courts themselves. They depend on a majority of each court’s
active judges agreeing to ask Congress for more judicial help (and then on
Congress having the political will to act on that recommendation).45 There
has never been a majority of active judges on the Eleventh Circuit with the
desire to make that request. For example, the Eleventh Circuit’s then-chief
judge told Congress in 2002 during a hearing on judicial vacancies:
“Although the Court leads the nation in number of cases per judge in most
categories, twelve judges are enough.”46 That year, the Eleventh Circuit had
40 Compare JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., JUDGESHIP RECOMMENDATIONS tbl.1 (2021), https://www.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2021_judicial_conference_recommendations_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
3R7P-F3PQ] (requesting two permanent judgeships for the Ninth Circuit), with JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S.,
JUDGESHIP RECOMMENDATIONS tbl.1 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019_
judicial_conference_judgeship_recommendations_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLQ5-P72C] (requesting five
permanent judgeships for the Ninth Circuit).
41 See infra Appendix B (charting the history of requests for additional authorized judgeships).
Congress added three judges to the Fifth Circuit through two bills in 1984 and 1990. See Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 201(a)(1), 98 Stat. 333, 346;
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 202(a)(3), 104 Stat. 5089, 5099.
42 Compare ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS - JUDICIAL CASELOAD
PROFILE,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_appprofile0331.2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PMT9-UGR7] (detailing that the Eleventh Circuit had 4,955 total filings in the twelvemonth period ending on March 31, 2021), with Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Reorganization Act of 1980, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 523, 523 n.2 (detailing that the old Fifth Circuit had
4,404 total filings in the twelve-month period ending on September 30, 1980 before its October 1, 1981
reorganization).
43 Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, 79 A.B.A. J. 70, 72 (1993) (describing the old
Fifth Circuit, the author’s former court, as a “jumbo court”).
44 Ainsworth, supra note 42, at 523.
45 See infra notes 282–283 and accompanying text (discussing the current process for evaluating
judicial need).
46 A Judiciary Diminished Is Justice Denied: The Constitution, the Senate, and the Vacancy Crisis
in the Federal Judiciary: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
H.R., 107th Cong. 90 (2002) (statement of J.L. Edmondson, C.J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit).
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7,431 filings—three thousand more filings than the old Fifth Circuit with its
twenty-six judges had in 1980.47 But “twelve judges are enough.” End of
discussion.
To be sure, we owe some deference to the courts in determining how
best to distribute Article III resources. No doubt, the Eleventh Circuit’s view
of its own judicial need may have been shaped by having once been a jumbo
court with twenty-six judges—a situation that former Fifth Circuit judges
found unworkable. 48 But deference to judicial self-perceptions of need
cannot be both the beginning and the end of the discussion. At the very least,
where Congress defers to judicial recommendations for adding authorized
judgeships, the process for developing those recommendations should be
open and transparent, and it should take into account dissenting voices and
the possibility of judicial entrenchment.49
This Article will proceed in three Parts. Part I details the federal
appellate triage system, including its constituent parts, existing criticisms,
and suggestions for reform. Part II describes the toll that the tiers of federal
appellate justice have taken on the federal system, examining the ways in
which (at least some) courts have taken procedural shortcuts too far. In
particular, it argues that maintenance of these systems may have a disparate
impact based on race and, to a lesser extent, class. Part III offers a framework
for Congress to distribute Article III resources by reimagining how we
evaluate judicial need and resource allocation across the federal courts of
appeals. It explains why and how some of the existing models fall short, and
it offers alternatives that both rely less on majority rule in making judgeship
recommendations and incentivize courts to avoid overreliance on nonjudicial
decision-makers.
I.

TWO TIERS OF FEDERAL APPELLATE JUSTICE

The modern federal appellate triage system generally divides the
pathway for federal appeals in two: an oral-argument track to which Article
III judges devote the most attention and a nonargument track to which
nonjudges devote the most attention. These tracks, which I call “tiers”
47 Compare ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2002 tbl.B
(2002), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/b00dec02.pdf [https://perma.
cc/46W4-93EF] (detailing that the Eleventh Circuit had 7,431 filings in the twelve-month period ending
on December 31, 2002), with Ainsworth, supra note 42, at 523 n.2 (detailing that the old Fifth Circuit
had 4,404 filings in the twelve-month period before its October 1, 1981 reorganization).
48 See Tjoflat, supra note 43, at 70 (arguing for a small federal appellate judiciary and emphasizing
difficulties encountered on the jumbo old Fifth Circuit).
49 See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Assessing Judgeship Needs in the Federal Courts of Appeals:
Policy Choices and Process Concerns, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 239, 264–67 (2003) (making
recommendations to reform the Judicial Conference process related to assessment of judicial need).
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because it more accurately reflects how courts prioritize (and not just
separate) appeals, largely began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when
docket demands forced changes in internal court procedures. 50 This Part
explains how the tiers came to be, describes their constituent parts, and
considers existing suggestions for reform.
A. How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Distribute Article III Resources
How the U.S. Courts of Appeals handle appeals today is not how it has
always been done.51 Once upon a time, federal appellate judges did not have
law clerks or central judicial staff. Instead, they read the briefs themselves,
heard cases argued orally, and issued decisions they wrote themselves. 52
With some nostalgia, scholars have described these as the “Learned Hand”
days, when, in a land temporally far, far away, judges did the judging
themselves with little to no help.53
The Learned Hand days are long gone. Between the 1960s and the
1980s, the federal appellate courts instituted a number of reforms—all court
initiated54—to revise their internal decisional processes. Ostensibly, these
reforms responded to what has been termed a “crisis of volume,”55 where
supply (judges) did not keep up with demand (appeals). Indeed, during this
period, appeals to the federal circuit courts swelled from 3,765 in 1960 to
37,524 in 1988,56 an increase of nearly 900%. At the same time, the number
of federal appellate judges in the geographic circuits grew too—from 68 to

50 This history has been recounted in greater detail by others. See, e.g., RICHMAN & REYNOLDS,
supra note 14, at 1–16 (discussing the caseload crisis leading to internal procedural reforms); see also
Haworth, supra note 33, at 258–64 (explaining the need for courts to develop more efficient procedures
in response to caseload pressures).
51 The current structure of the U.S. Courts of Appeals is not the same, either. For a succinct history
of the evolution of the federal appellate system, see Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal:
A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L. REV. 411, 411‒31 (1987).
52 See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 278 (1996) (describing “traditional
appellate procedure”).
53 See id.
54 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 115 (describing reforms as being “unilateral”).
55 See DANIEL J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 72‒
75 (1974) (examining how two state appellate courts responded to a “crisis of volume” as models for
broader institutional reforms); see also PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR & MAURICE
ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL, at V (1976) (“A cause for deep concern about appellate justice is the
runaway inflation in the volume of appeals.”); Irving R. Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An
Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1094 (1974) (recognizing the “caseload crisis
affecting” the Second Circuit and “other federal appellate courts”).
56 DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 15 tbl.1.2 (2000).

1148

116:1137 (2022)

Rebuilding the Federal Circuit Courts

167 by 1990.57 But the pace of growth in cases dwarfed the growth in judges.
Put differently, in 1960 litigants filed approximately 55 appeals per
authorized judgeship; three decades later, they were filing 225.58
The volume of appellate activity at the federal level has recently
receded,59 but the overall volume remains quite high—and higher than the
40,898 appeals filed in 1990, when Congress last added authorized
judgeships to the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 60 In the 2020 reporting year,
litigants commenced 48,190 appeals across the geographic circuits.61 That
reflects an approximately 18% increase over three decades—all during a
time when the number of authorized judgeships has remained static.
At least some decisional and structural reforms were necessary to tackle
demand. Courts are not efficient markets. As Professor Lawrence Friedman
observed at the outset of the crisis: where “too many problems of a familiar
kind arise”—that is, if too many cases are filed—“[t]he American judicial
system . . . cannot . . . react to increased demand simply by giving additional
service.”62 Structural limitations therefore informed how and in what ways
the courts could adapt to the demand that the rise in appeals placed on them.
Ultimately, the courts’ adaptation is the modern federal appellate triage
system, which has three important constituent parts: using unpublished
decisions, reducing oral argument, and relying on central staff. Each is
crucial to the whole, and each is the subject of its own body of scholarly
work and critique (as is the triage system itself). Below, I will touch briefly
on unpublished decisions and the reduction in oral argument before devoting
more time and attention to the use of central staff in courts.

57 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS
[hereinafter ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
appealsauth.pdf [https://perma.cc/KEW7-GYL8].
58 Notably, these statistics are not weighted by circuit, and some circuits see greater volume than
others. See Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and Confronting the Federal Judiciary Capacity
“Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 859 fig.21 (2020)
(illustrating that in 2017 the Fifth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit had the heaviest workload per judge).
59 See McAlister, supra note 27, at 552 fig.3 (identifying a downward trend in caseload volume).
60 Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the “Crisis of Volume” in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97, 103 (1994); see ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED
JUDGESHIPS, supra note 57.
61 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b_
0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E8E-Y2CW].
62 Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786,
798 (1967).
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1. Unpublished Decisions
Chronologically speaking, the first of these structural shifts was the
invention of the so-called “unpublished” decision.63 An unpublished decision
is an opinion not designated by the court for inclusion in West’s Federal
Reporter, and as a result it is not precedential.64 That is not to suggest that
before the label “unpublished” arrived all federal appellate decisions were
always published in the sense of being printed in a book, but it is to say that
before then, courts didn’t make a precedential 65 distinction between
decisions that were printed in books and those that weren’t.66 Categorically
nonprecedential decisions are a mid-twentieth-century invention.67
The reason for the innovation was straightforward68: if the courts could
resolve some appeals without worrying about making law (that is, setting
precedent), they could dispose of those cases more quickly (because it
presumably takes more time to write lawmaking decisions). 69 At least
initially, it was thought that all unpublished decisions would still be reasoned
decisions—even if not as thorough as their precedential counterparts—but
that ideal has given way with time. 70 After all, it’s more efficient to say
nothing at all—especially when judges worry that the “sloppy”71 work in
unpublished decisions might be cited back as persuasive authority.72 For this
63 See generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—
Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1167, 1168 (1978) (tracing the early history of unpublished decisions).
64 See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the
United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 577 n.12, 581 (1981)
(“West publishes only opinions designated for publication by the several circuits.”).
65 We thought of precedent differently too, but that’s beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Hart
v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The modern concept of binding precedent—where
a single opinion sets the course on a particular point of law and must be followed by courts at the same
level and lower within a pyramidal judicial hierarchy—came about only gradually over the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.”).
66 See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing the history of
publication), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.) (en banc).
67 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 11 (“Limited publication has been actively
considered by the federal judicial establishment since the end of World War II.”).
68 There was another, even more practical reason to reduce publication: the growing volume of
lawbooks. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 63, at 1168–69 (describing concerns over the growing
volume of decisional law); see also John B. Winslow, The Courts and the Papermills, 10 ILL. L. REV.
157, 158 (1915) (“The law library of the future staggers the imagination as one thinks of multitudes of
shelves . . . all loaded with their many volumes of precious precedents.”).
69 See McAlister, supra note 27, at 538–41 (discussing and developing an efficiency rationale for
unpublished decisions that are poorly and lightly reasoned).
70 See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 64, at 601–02, 606 (observing that the “lower quality of
unpublished opinions may be the most important of the costs of limited publication”).
71 See Pether, supra note 25, at 6, 17 (discussing perceptions of staff attorneys’ work).
72 See McAlister, supra note 8, at 1101, 1111–14, 1111 n.48, 1146 (2021) (discussing no-citation
rules and objections to those rules, and also collecting sources).
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reason, until a 2006 rule change,73 unpublished decisions were not citable in
most circuits (even back to the issuing circuit).74
Today, more than 85% of federal appellate decisions on the merits—a
category that includes decisions resolving appeals as of right and original
applications to the appellate courts for relief 75 —are unpublished. 76 The
federal appellate courts do little formal, precedential lawmaking—at least
compared to the volume of appeals they resolve—but they create a whole lot
of poor, recycled lawmaking in “copy-paste,” nonprecedential unpublished
decisions.77
Some circuits rely on the procedural shortcuts of unpublication more
than others.78 Some of these variations are inexplicable, as we’d not expect
any appellate court—outside of the D.C. Circuit, perhaps 79 —to have any
greater need for formal lawmaking than any other similarly situated court.
I’ll return to this important point in Section II.B, as it is foundational to
understanding the disparate impact of the federal appellate triage regime.
Of the institutional reforms the courts undertook in response to their
perceived caseload crisis, the use—and ever-expanding use—of unpublished
decisions has been perhaps the most controversial reform.80 It has received

73

FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 63, at 1180–81 (discussing different circuit approaches to
so-called “no citation rules”).
75 See McAlister, supra note 8, at 1116–17 (describing categories of appellate terminations on the
merits).
76 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-12 (indicating that 87% of merits terminations nationwide are
unpublished).
77 See Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 153, 153–54 (2012)
(examining how unpublished decisions are “repeatedly copied and pasted into other unpublished
opinions,” infecting such decisions with errors that are hard to fix “because no one thinks to do so”).
78 See McAlister, supra note 27, at 550–51 (discussing disparities in publication rates across circuits).
79 See Eric M. Fraser, David K. Kessler, Matthew J.B. Lawrence & Stephen A. Calhoun, The
Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 132 & n.2 (2013) (discussing “the
accepted wisdom that the D.C. Circuit is ‘a special court’ that tackles a disproportionate share of thorny
administrative and regulatory cases affecting a wide range of important national public policy issues”).
80 See Pether, supra note 25, at 7 (describing the scholarly critique of “institutionalized
unpublication” as “multiplicitous and damning”).
74
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the most scholarly treatment, 81 judicial debate (and defense), 82 and
rulemaking attention. 83 But little of that critique has moved the needle.
Today, unpublished decisions are as prevalent as they ever have been84—
even though the courts see nearly 20,000 fewer cases than they did at the
caseload zenith in 2005, when the unpublication rate was lower than it is
today.85
2. Reduction in Oral Argument
Around the same time that unpublished decisions emerged, the courts
also started decreasing their reliance on oral argument.86 A 1979 rule change
authorized resolution of appeals without oral argument when the appeal was
frivolous, when the issues had already been “authoritatively decided,” or
when the court’s decision-making process “would not be significantly aided
by oral argument.”87 Federal rules permit the parties to make a statement
81 The literature on unpublished decisions is vast and varied; it challenges every aspect of the
practice. See, e.g., Pether, supra note 15, at 1483, 1511 & nn.441–42 (identifying damaging “rule of law”
effects of unpublication, including that it enables power in that repeat litigants can rig the system in their
favor); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 64, at 574 (evaluating and critiquing the substance of
unpublished decisions); David Dunn, Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals,
63 CORNELL L. REV. 128, 141–45 (1977) (discussing cases that examined the no-citation rule under
principles of due process and equal protection); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes, Constitutionality
of “No-Citation” Rules, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 287, 297–315 (2001) (arguing that the no-citation
rule violates the First Amendment); see also David S. Caudill, Parades of Horribles, Circles of Hell:
Ethical Dimensions of the Publication Controversy, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1653, 1657 (2005) (raising
ethical concerns with unpublished decisions); Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished
Opinions, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723, 725 (2008) (similar); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Legal Fiction of
the “Unpublished” Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Citation Rules and the Ethical Duty of Candor,
1 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 27, 31 (2005) (similar).
82 Preeminent Eighth Circuit Judge Richard Arnold and now-disgraced but once-preeminent Ninth
Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski disagreed over the constitutionality of unpublished decisions in Anastasoff
v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.) (en banc),
and Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001).
83 For a discussion of the contentious and lengthy debates over FED. R. APP. P. 32.1, see the work of
the Reporter to the Advisory Committee, Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm
Und Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1458–90 (2005).
84 See infra Table 3 and accompanying text (describing the current use of unpublication across
circuits and five-year averages).
85 Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2005, at tbl.B (68,473 appeals commenced), with JUDICIAL
BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B (48,190 appeals commenced); compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2005, at tbl.S-3
(81.6% unpublication rate), with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-12 (87% unpublication rate).
86 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 92 (discussing reduction in oral argument and
observing that in Administrative Office Reporting Year 2010, “only 26.4 percent of all appeals were
terminated following an ‘oral hearing,’” whereas “[i]n 1985, 56 percent of terminations followed oral
argument”).
87 FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2) (“Oral argument must be allowed in every case unless a panel of three
judges who have examined the briefs and record unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary
for any of the following reasons: (A) the appeal is frivolous; (B) the dispositive issue or issues have been
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respecting a request (or not) for oral argument,88 but courts are opaque in
their decisions to grant or deny such requests.89
The result is that oral argument has been on a precipitous decline ever
since—and it has also gotten shorter. In the 1970s, oral argument of thirty
minutes per side was routine.90 Two-thirds of all appeals were argued orally
in the early 1980s; by 2011, only one-quarter of all federal appeals were
argued orally.91 By reporting year 2020, oral argument had dropped to less
than 20% across all circuits, with one circuit only hearing argument in 11%
of appeals (the Eleventh Circuit) and only two circuits hearing argument in
close to or more than 40% of appeals (the D.C. Circuit and the Seventh
Circuit).92 And in most circuits, the time allotted for oral argument is fifteen
minutes or less (with five minutes on the low end—for pro se litigants in the
Second Circuit93—and twenty minutes on the high end).94
The reduction in oral argument has received its own criticism,95 though
that criticism has paled in comparison to the academic hostility directed at
the constellation of issues related to unpublication. Concerns over the
reduction in oral argument mirror those over other components of the triage
scheme, focusing on how a reduction in oral argument also reduces judicial
engagement.96 Ultimately, in the words of one scholar, the courts now have

authoritatively decided; or (C) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and
record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.”).
88 Id. 34(a)(1).
89 See David R. Cleveland & Steven Wisotsky, The Decline of Oral Argument in the Federal Courts
of Appeals: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 119, 138–39 (2012) (discussing
transparency issues related to the denial of oral argument).
90 Id. at 119.
91 Id. at 119–20 & nn.2–3; see also Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity
and Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 345–47 (2011) [hereinafter Levy,
Mechanics] (discussing the decline of oral argument and the related increased reliance on centralized
judicial staff attorneys).
92 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-10.
93 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 93.
94 See Levy, Mechanics, supra note 91, at 355–56 (discussing various approaches to oral argument).
95 See, e.g., Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the
Conventional Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (recognizing that “extent to which many appellate
courts have eliminated or severely restricted oral argument” has “caused more concern among both
appellate judges and appellate lawyers” than other procedural reforms); Cleveland & Wisotsky, supra
note 89, at 121 (arguing that reduction in oral argument has “weakened or diluted” “values implicit in
appellate review” and noting that there has been a concomitant decline in reversal rates); see also
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 94 (expressing concern that courts deny oral argument
inconsistently and “for no apparent reason”).
96 See, e.g., John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit’s Experience in the Eighties
and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 860 (observing that case-screening
procedures that lead to nonargument involve “a significantly lesser degree of personal attention by
judges”).
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a “more efficient but more paper-driven bureaucratic process of appellate
decision-making.”97
3. Central Staff Attorneys
The final institutional reform was the development of central
nonjudicial staff to handle the cases that would receive neither lawmaking
treatment nor oral argument. The reduction in publication and oral argument
were public-facing changes, but behind the scenes, the courts shifted their
organizational structure to account for these new decisional processes.
Scholars have observed that “[t]he most startling development in appellate
courts in the past quarter century has been the very marked increase in the
role played by nonjudicial personnel.”98 But the development shouldn’t have
been startling to those watching closely: having created a class of inferior
process, the courts needed a workforce to handle the cases relegated to the
second tier.99 Enter the central staff attorneys.
To understand the role of the staff attorney, we must first consider how
the position differs from the law clerk.100 Law clerks are recent law-school
graduates who work at a judge’s side in chambers, and thus sometimes are
known as “elbow clerks.”101 In 1930, Congress first authorized each federal
circuit judge to hire a single law clerk—conditioned, at the time, on the
approval of the Attorney General.102 By 1970, each circuit judge had two law
clerks; by 1980, some had three.103 Today, most active circuit judges have
four law clerks.104
Scholars trace the modern law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Horace
Gray.105 When he was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1882, Justice Gray
hired the first federal law clerk, continuing a practice he began while serving
97

Cleveland & Wisotsky, supra note 89, at 121.
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 97.
99 See also Pether, supra note 25, at 7 (arguing that “[t]he institution of the staff attorney/habeas
clerk/pro se clerk has its shared origins with modern institutionalized unpublication”).
100 For a history of the law clerk, see JOHN BILYEU OAKLEY & ROBERT S. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUALITIES AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW CLERKS IN
AMERICAN COURTS (1980).
101 Charles H. Sheldon, The Evolution of Law Clerking with the Washington Supreme Court: From
“Elbow Clerks” to “Puisne Judges,” 24 GONZ. L. REV. 45, 48 (1988).
102 Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 509, 46 Stat. 774.
103 OAKLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 100, at 19–20.
104 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14 at 97–98; see also Todd C. Peppers, Michael W. Giles &
Bridget Tainer-Parkins, Surgeons or Scribes? The Role of United States Court of Appeals Law Clerks in
“Appellate Triage,” 98 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 315 (2014) (noting that federal appellate judges may hire
four law clerks “if they forgo a second secretarial position”). I know of at least one federal appellate judge
who hired five clerks (one in a position that was designated as a staff attorney) to work in chambers.
105 See Todd C. Peppers, Birth of an Institution: Horace Gray and the Lost Law Clerks, 32 J. SUP.
CT. HIST. 229, 231 (2007).
98
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as the chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 106 Even
then, it was a position reserved for the elite: Justice Gray hired a “highly
ranked new graduate of the Harvard Law School,” at the recommendation of
his half-brother, Professor John Chipman Gray, who taught law at
Harvard.107 From there, the practice of hiring a law clerk spread to other
members of the Court (especially once Congress authorized funding for such
positions, given that Justice Gray had paid for his clerk, initially, out of his
own pocket).108 Those positions then, as they largely still are, were reserved
for high-achieving white men at elite institutions.109
Originally, law clerks were “sources of inspiration and criticism”; they
edited but did not draft the decisions the Justices wrote.110 Today, appellatelevel law clerks generally perform some combination or all of three tasks:
selecting (or screening) cases; drafting bench memoranda to prepare the
judge or justice for oral argument or decision; and drafting decisions and
opinions in (both argued and unargued) cases.111 In reality, few, if any, law
clerks serve merely as sounding boards for their judges, as judges have
delegated substantial responsibilities to their law clerks. That’s certainly not
all bad, of course, and perhaps is even, at times, quite desirable; judges are
able to do more by delegating research assignments and drafting tasks to law
clerks. They can give more attention to more cases that way. And even where
the amount of delegation is great, law clerks remain under the direct
supervision of a judge; a law clerk may be to a judge what an associate is to
a law-firm partner.
But the amount of delegation of judicial work within the federal
appellate courts extends well beyond the law clerk. There’s another layer
106 OAKLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 100, at 10–11 (discussing the origins of the law clerk role and
Justice Gray’s paternity of the practice).
107 Id. at 11.
108 Id. In 1886, Congress funded an “assistant” position, which usually performed secretarial work.
Id. at 15. In 1919, Congress funded both a “law clerk” and a “stenographic clerk” position for each Justice.
Id. at 16–17.
109 See Tony Mauro, Diversity and Supreme Court Law Clerks, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 361, 361, 363–65
(2014) (discussing the fact that overwhelmingly Supreme Court clerks have been white men). The first
female law clerk was not hired until 1944; the next was not hired until 1966. See Mark R. Brown, Gender
Discrimination in the Supreme Court’s Clerkship Selection Process, 75 OR. L. REV. 359, 362 n.19 (1996).
In the early days, the Justices preferred law students tapped by law professors and deans at Harvard, Yale,
and Columbia. See OAKLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 100, at 17 (tracing the early history of Supreme
Court law clerks and connections to these schools). They still do. See Jason Iuliano & Avery Stewart, The
New Diversity Crisis in the Federal Judiciary, 84 TENN. L. REV. 247, 296 (2016) (gathering data to show
that approximately 70% of Supreme Court clerks hired between October Term 1950 and October Term
2015 came from one of just six schools: Harvard (24.8%), Yale (19.0%), the University of Chicago
(8.2%), Stanford (6.7%), the University of Virginia (5.6%), or Columbia (5.5%)).
110 OAKLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 100, at 14.
111 MEADOR, supra note 55, at 73 (describing law clerks’ responsibilities).

1155

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

within the federal appellate bureaucracy: the central staff attorney. The idea
of a centralized nonjudicial staff appears to have originated in the Michigan
Court of Appeals.112 These staff attorneys were “central” because they did
not work for any one judge, nor did they work in any judge’s chambers.113
Although judges embraced the role of the law clerk, there was greater
reluctance among the judiciary to embrace the role of central legal staff—at
least at first. 114 As the late Professor Daniel Meador and author Jordana
Bernstein described: “Although those judges had long been accustomed to
law clerks in their chambers, they were troubled by the idea of a centralized
staff not under their close supervision. That arrangement . . . seemed to
suggest the possibility of unduly delegating judicial work to non-judges.”115
But successful pilot projects among busy state appellate courts proved to
judges’ satisfaction that such staff could “improve the courts’ productivity
without apparent impairment of the judicial process.”116 And the continuing
rise in caseloads across all appellate courts provided the necessary
motivation for judges to overcome their early reluctance to embrace central
staff.117 For proof of this widespread acceptance, look to the American Bar
Association, whose standards relating to appellate courts embraced the idea
of a central staff in 1977 (within a decade of the first robust experiment) and
by 1985 featured extensive commentary on how best to utilize such staff.118
In the federal appellate system, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits appear to
have been the first to experiment with central staff, hiring “habeas clerks” in
the 1960s to handle “the explosion of cases brought by state prison inmates

112 See OAKLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 100, at 23–24 (“While isolated examples of utilization of
a centralized pool of legal assistants to a court have existed for some years, it was the creation of a central
staff at the Michigan Court of Appeals a decade ago [in 1968] that ‘gave impetus and focus to the
contemporary development’ of the process.” (quoting MEADOR, supra note 55, at 17)); see also DANIEL
JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 108–09
(1994) (similar).
113 MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 112, at 108 (“Central staff attorneys are lawyers employed by
an appellate court to work for the court as an entity. . . . [T]hey have no close relationship to any particular
judge. They are organized centrally under the supervision of a lawyer who is the head of the staff and
who in turn is answerable to the court.”).
114 Id. at 109 (observing that the use of a central legal staff “spread gradually, meeting with resistance
from appellate judges”).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. (“The other development motivating courts to employ central staffs was the continuing rise in
their caseloads. Each year during the 1970s brought an increase in appellate filings in many courts all
across the country.”).
118 See id. at 110 (“In effect, the ABA standards provided a formal legitimation of the concept by the
American legal-judicial community.”).
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seeking habeas corpus relief or relief under the civil rights statutes.”119 In
other circuits, central staff emerged from “pro se deputy clerks of the clerk’s
office, and law clerks to senior judges,” the latter of which “were stationed
as a pool at the circuit headquarters.”120 Both shared similar responsibilities,
focusing on pro se (which would include habeas corpus) litigation. 121 As
Professor Pether’s groundbreaking work revealed, the development of the
staff attorneys’ offices—like all of the triage reforms—was intimately
connected to a perceived flood of appeals from the system’s “have-nots”
(namely, prisoners and civil rights claimants).122 This innovation permitted
judges (and their elbow clerks123) to focus on the “relatively few important
cases,” while staff attorneys handled “the larger, but more prosaic group of
cases.”124
Initially, beginning in 1973, individual courts began requesting funds
to support central-staff programs.125 By 1975, Congress officially authorized
the appointment by a circuit’s chief judge of a “senior law clerk,” who would
serve a centralized role. 126 In 1982, Congress codified the central-staff
programs that had developed across the circuits under that prior
authorization.127 That new law authorized the chief judge to “appoint a senior
staff attorney,” who could in turn appoint “necessary staff attorneys and

119 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 103. Professor Meador traces the federal lineage of the
central judicial staff to the United States Court of Military Appeals, which had employed research
attorneys, called commissioners, since its creation in 1951. See FED. JUD. CTR., CENTRAL LEGAL STAFFS
IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 1 (1978) [hereinafter CENTRAL LEGAL STAFFS],
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/49649NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT52-YU8A] (citing
MEADOR, supra note 55, at 218).
120 CENTRAL LEGAL STAFFS, supra note 119, at 1–2.
121 Id.
122 Pether, supra note 25, at 53–54 (observing that judges view “‘have-not’ litigants . . . as
troublesome or vexatious [and] their appeals [as] unmeritorious”).
123 On this point, I disagree in some respects with Professor Pether, who suggests that work by elbow
clerks and staff attorneys is almost interchangeable—indeed, even her title suggests as much. See id. at 1
(titling the work “Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S.
Law”). Judge Posner’s recent work on staff attorneys is more consistent with my personal experience:
judges and their clerks work on the “important” cases; staff attorneys generally handle the rest. See
POSNER, supra note 10, at 50–59 (discussing the role of staff attorneys across the circuits); see id. at 162–
63 (noting that very few staff-attorney cases result in published decisions across the circuits, except in
the Seventh Circuit, where approximately 13% are published).
124 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 104.
125 CENTRAL LEGAL STAFFS, supra note 119, at 2.
126 Act of Oct. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-433, 88 Stat. 1187, 1202 (“[T]he chief judge of each circuit
may appoint a senior law clerk to the court at not more than $30,000 per annum.”); see also CENTRAL
LEGAL STAFFS, supra note 119, at 2 (identifying 1975 as the first year for congressional recognition of
central staff).
127 See CENTRAL LEGAL STAFFS, supra note 119, at 6–35 (surveying the state of central-staff
programs across the circuits by the late 1970s).
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secretarial and clerical employees in such numbers as the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts may approve.” 128 That
law remains in effect today. 129 Initially, the Judicial Conference—the
policymaking body of the federal courts130—adopted guidelines limiting the
ratio of staff attorneys to authorized judgeships to reduce the risk of
overdelegation.131 But those limitations were revisited over time as caseload
demand continued to increase and judges did not.132
Just like with law clerks, it’s possible that more staff attorneys enable
judges to spend more time on more cases. But law clerks and staff attorneys
are distinct in ways that matter within the federal appellate system. First, and
perhaps foremost, staff attorneys are far removed—physically and
actually—from the oversight that judges exert over their elbow clerks.133 As
is typical with any central staff, judicial oversight of the staff attorneys is, at
best, only indirect.134 Second, staff attorneys focus on productive quantity
over quality; staff attorneys are sometimes required to hit quotas in
processing cases for decision.135 Third, staff-attorney positions carry far less
cachet and prestige, perhaps because they work predominately on the court’s
“low status” cases,136 thus potentially affecting the quality of applicants137
and the incentives that drive staff attorneys themselves.138
Structurally, staff attorneys do the work that judges don’t want to do so
that judicial time may be spent on other, more “important” matters (that
judges work on with elbow clerks). Their job, fundamentally, is to take work

128 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 120(c)(1), 96 Stat. 25, 34
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 715).
129 28 U.S.C. § 715.
130 Congress created the Judicial Conference in 1922 to generate policy guidelines for administration
of the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 331.
131 See Baker, supra note 24, at 949 (discussing the history of staff-attorney program and Judicial
Conference recommendations regarding staffing ratios).
132 Id.
133 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 103.
134 See MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 112, at 112 (“The staff director or chief staff attorney, as
this officer is usually called, is typically the only member of the staff who has contact with the court’s
judges, and that contact is often limited to dealings with the chief judge.”). But see POSNER, supra note
10, at 59 (noting limited interactions between judges and staff attorneys in most circuits).
135 See POSNER, supra note 10, at 57 (“Line attorneys [in the Eleventh Circuit] must complete a quota
of cases by the end of every two months.”).
136 See Pether, supra note 25, at 53 (describing the “work that produces unpublished opinions and
the work of producing them” as being “perceived as low status”).
137 Id. at 54 (noting that staff attorneys “generally do not have the blue chip credentials of those in
elite elbow clerkships”).
138 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 10, at 59 (noting that Seventh Circuit staff attorneys reported to
Judge Posner that staff attorneys in other circuits were “reluctant to recommend reversal of a district
judge”).
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off a judge’s plate and not add to it—including, perhaps, by identifying an
issue that needs greater judicial scrutiny. In some circuits, there appears to
be a norm against staff attorneys recommending reversal, for example.139 If
law clerks enable judges, individually, to do more (e.g., hear more cases and
write more precedential decisions), then we might think of staff attorneys as
enabling courts, collectively, to do more (e.g., terminate more appeals more
quickly).
As with each of these reforms, the rise of central staff is not without
controversy.140 But reliance on and a need for central staff was inevitable; the
courts never asked Congress for sufficient judicial resources to keep pace
with the demands on their time.141 Put simply, someone needed to do the
work that the caseload increase put on the courts, or else decision times
would lag as dockets swelled. Central staff thus are essential to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals’ ability to process and decide cases—and they remain
essential today even as caseload volumes have stabilized.
4. Bringing It Together: The Triage System and the Tiers
With these constituent parts established—unpublication, nonargument,
and central staff—we have a fuller picture of the two tiers of federal appellate
decision-making. There’s a first tier: oral argument, significant Article III
attention, and (most likely) a published, precedential adjudication. And
there’s a second tier: no oral argument, primarily central staff attention, and
(most likely) an unpublished adjudication. The pivotal question, then, is how
do courts decide which appeals belong to which tier? As I detail here, the
answer is that through a combination of default rules and (mostly)
nonjudicial review, courts divide the world into the procedural haves and
have-nots.
At the risk of oversimplification, most circuits task nonjudicial staff—
members of a central staff-attorneys’ office or attorneys who work for the
clerk’s office—with an initial review of every appeal.142 That initial review
See id. (noting that “many of the staff attorneys in the other circuits [outside of the Seventh
Circuit] were reluctant to recommend reversal of a district court judge”).
140 See Pether, supra note 25, at 18–19 (arguing that increased reliance on staff attorneys has
impoverished the federal appellate system); POSNER, supra note 10, at 62–64 (arguing for reform of the
staff-attorney system across the circuits).
141 That is not to say that the courts did not ask Congress for any Article III help, nor to suggest that
some courts (mainly, the Ninth Circuit) have not continued to do so. See infra Table 13 and accompanying
text (discussing recent requests to add authorized judgeships). But those requests did not keep pace with
caseload demands, and judges routinely expressed concern over growing the federal bench too much. See
infra notes 285–287 and accompanying text (discussing judicial opposition to growing the federal bench).
142 See POSNER, supra note 10, at 49–61, 162–65 (discussing the use of staff-attorneys’ offices across
circuits); Levy, Mechanics, supra note 91, at 333–39 (discussing screening procedures in the D.C., First,
139

1159

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

or “screen” may involve review for jurisdictional defects, relative
complexity, and the triage decision itself—that is, whether the appeal should
proceed to the first tier (judicial) or the second tier (central staff).143 Even
after staff designate an appeal for second-tier treatment, however, a judge
can reassign a case to the “regular” or first-tier process.144
Even in circuits that do not rely on central staff to make the (or at least
an initial) triage choice, default processing rules route certain appeals to
nonargument tracks. In the Third Circuit, the judges generally screen appeals
in the first instance for oral argument (thus, for first-tier review), but certain
cases (pro se appeals not involving direct criminal appeals and immigration
appeals) go to dedicated nonargument panels by default. 145 In the Second
Circuit, all cases (even pro se appeals) are set for oral argument by default,
except that “most immigration appeals are sent to a dedicated ‘NonArgument Calendar,’” 146 an innovation the Second Circuit developed in
response to a “flood of asylum claims . . . from 2002 through 2004.”147
Only one Circuit—the Tenth Circuit—appears not to rely on central
staff to screen appeals or handle certain classes of appeals by default. 148
Tenth Circuit judges make all screening decisions and decide, on an
individual basis, to send some cases to the second tier, while setting other
cases for oral argument.149 As you’ll see, the Tenth Circuit is the least busy

Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits and noting “complexity, variation, and importance” of courts’ casemanagement procedures); see also Newman, supra note 34, at 432 (“In most other circuits [outside of the
Second Circuit], all cases are reviewed at an early stage to determine whether they warrant oral argument
or should be decided on the briefs without argument.”).
143 See Levy, Mechanics, supra note 91, at 333–40 (noting that “[d]epending on the circuit, this
screening is performed by counsel in the clerk’s office, by staff attorneys, or by judges,” and describing
the nature of the initial review across the circuits by different decision-makers).
144 Id. at 339. This is, to be sure, a meaningful and necessary check in an effective triage system, but
the extent to which individual judges exercise that discretion and oversight is unknowable. Moreover, the
data on certiorari grants discussed below suggest that, at least in some circuits, the check may be less
effective. See infra Section II.A (discussing the extent to which the Supreme Court has reviewed
unpublished decisions through its certiorari process). Further, to the extent that circuits have norms
against staff-attorney recommendations of reversal—a norm that Judge Posner’s work suggests—that too
would undermine the meaningfulness of this systemic check, given the staff attorneys’ primacy in this
process. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 135.
145 POSNER, supra note 10, at 164; see also Levy, Mechanics, supra note 91, at 351 (“[T]he Third
Circuit does not have its staff attorneys screen cases for oral argument. Rather, only particular kinds of
cases—pro se cases that do not involve direct criminal appeals and most immigration cases—are sent to
panels that do not hear argument.”).
146 See Levy, Mechanics, supra note 91, at 336–37 (discussing Second Circuit procedures).
147 See Newman, supra note 34, at 429; Levy, Mechanics, supra note 91, at 349–50 (describing
Second Circuit Non-Argument Calendar procedures).
148 See POSNER, supra note 10, at 164–65.
149 See id. at 56 (“In the Tenth Circuit, judges perform all screening of cases. Nonargument cases are
then moved to the staff attorney’s office, whose director assigns line staff attorneys to a mix of cases.”).
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of the geographic circuits150—a fact that suggests that where judges have
more time to devote to the triage decision, they do that important work.
Ultimately, whomever or whatever makes the decision—a judge, law
clerk, staff attorney, or default rule—the federal appellate courts triage every
appeal. That screening decision determines whether an appeal will receive
first- or second-tier treatment. The choice to streamline appellate procedure
may be a needed efficiency, an abandonment of traditional appellate values,
or some combination of both. The next Section addresses some of the
criticisms the triage regime has received.
B. Criticisms and Suggestions for Reform
Scholars began sounding the alarm about the federal appellate system’s
revised decisional procedures early. The late Professor Charles Haworth’s
1973 article on the old Fifth Circuit’s “screening and summary procedures”
warned that the court’s “dramatic innovations . . . may be the standard
procedure for all appeals in both the state and federal systems within the next
five years.”151 He was basically right.
Professor Haworth’s work also revealed a troubling fact: the Fifth
Circuit’s procedures—however necessary they may have been—correlated
with a statistically significant reduction in the reversal rate in the Fifth
Circuit (and as compared to another circuit, the Third Circuit, which had not
yet instituted such procedures). 152 Before it began experimenting with
summary procedures and screening in the late 1960s, the court’s median
reversal rate had been between 27.1% and 27.4%. 153 The rate dipped to
14.9% within two years of the Fifth Circuit’s “extensive use” of summary
procedures.154 In the 2020 reporting year, the Fifth Circuit’s reversal rate was
5.8%, and the Eleventh Circuit’s reversal rate was 8.3%155 (recall that the
latter was part of the Fifth Circuit when Professor Haworth was writing).
At the time of Professor Haworth’s work, every court that used
summary or screening procedures continued to rely on judges to make those
150

See infra note 305 and accompanying text (identifying the volume of appellate activity in the
Tenth Circuit and discussing the recommendation that a vacancy on that court go unfilled); infra Table
12.
151 Haworth, supra note 33, at 264.
152 Id. at 317 (“The thesis of the statistical test was simply to determine if a relation existed between
screening and summary procedures and affirmances of the lower court decision. The test showed that the
relation apparently exists, but it is not proof that the screening procedures were the cause of the relation.”);
see id. at 314–16 (discussing comparison with the Third Circuit).
153 Id. at 319.
154 Id.
155 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-5, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
jb_b5_0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DH2-CA63].
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decisions.156 What was most troubling, then, in Professor Haworth’s view
was the use of summary affirmances—one-word decisions that said no more
than “affirmed” or “enforced”—that circuit courts issued without oral
argument.157 Although such “without comment” decisions have been on the
decline in recent years,158 some courts continue to issue barely reasoned or
circular decisions while stating that they issue only reasoned appellate
decisions on the merits.159
From this early work on the effects of the federal appellate courts’
internal reforms, scholars have largely fallen into two camps of critique. The
“alarmists,” I’ll call them, are those like Professors Richman, Reynolds, and
Pether, who see the courts’ reforms as degrading foundational values and
who call for substantial reform—for example, growing significantly the
federal appellate bench or publishing all decisions. 160 Some judges, too,
undoubtedly fall into this category of critique; for example, by 1992, onefifth of federal appellate judges responding to a Federal Judicial Center
survey agreed that “the quality of appellate justice has been unacceptably
diminished by measures adopted by the courts to cope with rising
caseloads.”161
On the other hand, the “necessary-evil institutionalists,” I’ll call them,
recognize that some reform in response to caseloads was necessary—and
perhaps even beneficial in some ways—but also that shortcuts can be taken
too far. Many judges who defend the system fall into this camp.162 Professor
156
See Haworth, supra note 33, at 268–69 (describing screening procedures in the circuits as of the
early 1970s).
157 See id. at 317–19 (discussing concerns over deciding cases without oral argument).
158 See McAlister, supra note 8, at 1134 tbl.3 (identifying the percentage of decisions issued by each
circuit that have been described as unreasoned by courts).
159 See McAlister, supra note 27, at 575–82 (describing decisional practices of courts that purport to
issue only reasoned decisions and describing a body of unpublished decisions that are “Kafkaesque” in
nature).
160 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 179–80 (seeming to advocate for adding forty new
judges to the federal appellate bench); Pether, supra note 15, at 1535 (noting that solutions “to stopping
the practices of private judging would be to effectively publish all opinions, even if some have a
designated inferior precedential status,” to use a panel of interested persons to make decisions about
publication decisions, or both).
161 JUDITH A. MCKENNA, FED. JUD. CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 37 (1993).
162 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 168–69 (1996)
(“Given the workload of the federal courts of appeals today, the realistic choice is not between limited
publication, on the one hand, and, on the other, improving and then publishing all the opinions that are
not published today; it is . . . . between giving the parties reasons for the decision of their appeal and not
giving them reasons even though the appeal is not frivolous.”); Newman, supra note 34, at 437
(explaining and defending the Second Circuit’s use of a nonargument calendar as a “fair[], effective[],
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Levy’s careful work urging somewhat modest (but certainly needed) reforms
to reduce reliance on categorical screening rules and increase staff attorney
expertise may also fall into the institutionalist bucket.163 More recently, and
in a more technologically advanced critique, Professor Ryan Copus has
described how courts might use technology to better allocate judicial
attention based on a highly contextualized assessment of the potential need
for lawmaking and risk of error using “statistical precedent” and predictive
algorithms. 164 Professor Copus would rely on machine learning to make
better triage choices and help courts more accurately distribute their
attention.165
The courts themselves appear mostly indifferent to the criticisms their
procedures have received—except in so far as they agreed to reform the ban
on citing unpublished decisions in the early 2000s, 166 which is the only
significant reform undertaken to address concern over the outputs of the
triage process. 167 In subsequent years, the din has died down, and we’ve
become largely inured to the status quo. The next Part provides reasons to
challenge the status quo anew.
II. WHY THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS NEED REFORM
For better or, in my view, for worse, the U.S. Courts of Appeals
weathered the “crisis of volume” they faced during the last century. Scholars
have questioned whether that crisis was “real or imagined.”168 Regardless,
the procedures the courts developed to tackle it have become the accepted
and efficient[]” response to “an extraordinary challenge”); Martin, supra note 18, at 178–79 (“Whereas
academicians tend to see unpublished opinions as causing a variety of systemic problems, judges tend to
see them as a necessary, and not necessarily evil, part of the job.”).
163 See Levy, Judicial Attention, supra note 11, at 440, 443–46 (concluding “that many of the courts’
current case management practices are loosely consistent with . . . the twin goals of error correction and
law development” and also suggesting reforms). Professor Levy also appears to be of the view that the
courts should have more judges too. “The Need for New Lower Court Judgeships, 30 Years in the
Making”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 117th Cong. 9 (2021) (testimony of Marin K. Levy, Professor of Law, Duke University School
of Law) [hereinafter Levy Testimony], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20210224/111237/
HHRG-117-JU03-Wstate-LevyM-20210224-U1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6DT-88HN].
164 See Ryan W. Copus, Statistical Precedent: Allocating Judicial Attention, 73 VAND. L. REV. 605,
611 (2020) (advocating for the use of artificial intelligence to help judges identify and sort cases that
require more and less judicial attention).
165 Id.
166 See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (authorizing citation of any unpublished decision by any U.S. court of
appeals issued after January 1, 2007).
167 Even this modest reform was contentious. See Pether, supra note 25, at 2–3 (observing that Rule
32.1 involved “a bitter dispute over the apparently trivial issue of a proposed and eventually enacted
uniform citation rule” that “split[] the ranks of the federal judiciary”).
168 Thomas E. Baker, Applied Freakonomics: Explaining the “Crisis of Volume,” 8 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 101, 113 (2006).
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status quo. We have, in the words of one scholar, “defined down our
appellate values” to adjust to this new normal,169 in which judicial resources
are scarce and doled out sparingly to those deemed most deserving.
This Part takes stock of the toll the shortcuts have taken. I argue first
that the courts have overrelied on these procedural shortcuts and, next, that
their overreliance has imposed uneven burdens on the basis of race, class,
and geography. Some regions of the country—in particular, the whitest and
the wealthiest—benefit from more robust federal appellate process and have
greater access to Article III resources. Those disparities are neither
explicable nor the result of any transparent experimentation among the
courts. These are also disparities that defy an easy solution; these are not
differences in formal rules or lawmaking that might garner Supreme Court
attention. Yet they are possibly outcome determinative in at least some
cases—to the extent that greater judicial attention is more likely to result in
favorable outcomes in any individual case.
Let me emphasize from the outset that I make no claim that any of these
effects are intentional by the courts.170 This is a story of disparate impact, not
disparate treatment. 171 I do not seek to prove that racism or classism
motivated the courts to adopt the federal appellate triage system nor that
these systemic ills cause courts to maintain the systems they conceived. I do
argue, however, that these facially neutral procedures may
disproportionately harm people of color and poor communities, who tend to
live where these procedures are most used—and this alone is a reason to
rethink the distribution of Article III resources in the federal appellate
system.

169 Id. at 114 (“[W]e now take for granted what were once characterized as ‘emergency’ procedures.
We have lowered our expectations for appellate procedure. . . . We all have internalized the postmodern
norms of the minimalist procedural paradigm.”).
170 In so doing, I distinguish between purposeful racism that intentionally harms people of color and
government acts that otherwise appear facially race neutral yet impose a disproportionate harm on racial
minorities and maintain white supremacy. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363,
369 (1992) (“[D]espite . . . belief in the ‘rule of law’ . . . abstract principles lead to legal results that harm
blacks and perpetuate their inferior status.”); I. Bennett Capers, Critical Race Theory and Criminal
Justice, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2014) (“Critical Race Theorists have not placed their faith in neutral
procedures and the substantive doctrines of formal equality; . . . both the procedure and the substances of
American law, including American antidiscrimination law, are structured to maintain white privilege.”
(quoting Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris, Battles Waged, Won, and Lost:
Critical Race Theory at the Turn of the Millennium, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL
RACE THEORY 1, 1 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002))).
171 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (drawing a distinction between facially
neutral laws that have a racially disproportionate impact and those that “reflect[] a racially discriminatory
purpose”).
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A. Overuse of Shortcuts
The proliferation of the two-tiered system of appellate review has
created convenient and useful shortcuts for the courts. But it has gone too
far. That is a claim that is hard to prove as an empirical matter, but there are
signs pointing in that direction. This Section considers two such signs. First,
there has been a high number of certiorari grants in unpublished federal
appellate decisions in recent years, especially from courts that rely to a
greater extent on second-tier process. Second, the shortcuts have elevated
judicial preference and convenience over systemic interests in equal access
and equal treatment under the law.
1. Supreme Court Review of Unpublished Decisions
The federal appellate courts do not always do a very good job of
predicting when published, precedent-making decisions are needed and
when they are not. 172 In her 2021 testimony before the presidential
commission on Supreme Court reform, Professor Resnik revealed that
annually approximately one-seventh of the Supreme Court’s grants of
certiorari come from unpublished decisions.173 We might think that if the
triage system was working as it should, the Supreme Court would rarely, if
ever, have the need to grant certiorari review of any unpublished decision.
Unpublished decisions should not need error correction, nor should they be
used where lawmaking is needed.
Resnik’s back-of-the-envelope calculations went back three years; the
trend holds if we go back five years more (to October Term 2013). Isolating
opinions from grants of certiorari from the geographic federal courts of
appeals alone, 70 of 435 certiorari grants (16.1%) involved unpublished
adjudications in the circuit courts, 13 of 79 opinions reviewing state court
decisions (16.5%) involved unpublished adjudications in the lower state
court, and 4 of 33 certiorari grants from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (12.1%) came from unpublished decisions.174
The clear majority (more than 75%) of these cases were merits cases—
not summary adjudications. Only 14 of the 70 (20%) ended in per curiam
172 This problem was foreseen long ago by Professors Reynolds and Richman. See Reynolds &
Richman, supra note 63, at 1191–94 (arguing that judges may not be able to predict when decisions
should be precedential).
173 Judith Resnik, Statement for the Record for the Public Hearing, Presidential Commission on the
Supreme Court of the United States at 19 (June 30, 2021) [hereinafter Resnik Testimony], https://www.
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Resnik-PDF-Presidential-Commission.pdf [https://perma.
cc/B722-FF7J].
174 These numbers count consolidated cases as one opinion; I excluded opinions from within the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction or decisions arising from three-judge district court panels within
the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction. I coded the decisions based on lower court and publication status of
the decision from which certiorari was sought. All data are on file with author.
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summary decisions in which the Court reached the merits of a certiorari
petition without the benefit of oral argument. The rate of review for
unpublished decisions is highly variable across the geographic circuits. In
the First Circuit, for example, none of the Supreme Court’s 13 certiorari
grants over the last eight years involved an unpublished adjudication. That
may not be terribly surprising, given that the First Circuit has among the
highest publication rates in the country.175
Compare, then, the First Circuit’s track record to that of the Eleventh
Circuit: over the last eight years, nearly half (48.8%) of the 43 certiorari
grants from the Eleventh Circuit have involved unpublished decisions. No
other circuit comes close; indeed, that rate of review for unpublished
decisions from the Eleventh Circuit is more than two standard deviations
(12.8%) from the mean rate (13.9%) of review of unpublished decisions
across all geographic circuits. Table 1 identifies total certiorari grants since
2013 by geographic circuit and isolates those arising from unpublished
adjudications.
TABLE 1: CERTIORARI GRANTS BY CIRCUIT
Circuit
D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Total
Mean
Standard Deviation

Number of
Cert. Grants
30
13
33
24
26
47
45
20
27
100
27
43

Number from
Unpublished Decisions
1
0
5
2
1
13
8
1
3
12
3
21

Percentage from
Unpublished Decisions
3.3%
0.0%
15.2%
8.3%
3.8%
27.7%
17.8%
5.0%
11.1%
12.0%
11.1%
48.8%

435

70

16.1%
13.9%
12.8%

I don’t want to overstate the case, but these numbers—especially for
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits—seem surprising. It’s possible, of course,
that some unpublished decisions are unpublished because they apply settled
175
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circuit law that the Supreme Court later decides to review (where it did not
review the precedent-making decision). At least some of the certiorari grants
fall into this category; the Supreme Court’s decision to review Bostock v.
Clayton County, 176 an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, is one
prominent example.177 But that’s hardly always the case.178 And, in any event,
it’s hard to see why that particular practice—issuing an unpublished decision
noting that an argument was foreclosed by precedent or granting review to
overturn settled circuit law—would be any more common in one circuit than
it would be in any other circuit with a high rate of unpublished decisions.
In further support of this intuition, I note that the outcomes in Supreme
Court decisions reviewing unpublished decisions are not significantly
different from the outcomes in decisions reviewing published lower court
decisions. Table 2 identifies the rates of reversal, vacatur, and affirmance
across published and unpublished decisions over the last eight years. The
Court appears to be taking unpublished decisions to reverse settled law no
more often than it is in published decisions and vice versa. Nor, for that
matter, is the Court reviewing unpublished decisions simply to correct error.
TABLE 2: OUTCOMES AT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Published Decisions

Unpublished Decisions

Reversals
Reversal Rate

211
48.0%

44
51.8%

Vacaturs
Vacatur Rate

95
21.6%

21
24.7%

Affirmances
Affirmance Rate

134
30.5%

20
23.5%

Total

440

85

What’s more, anecdotally speaking at least, the Eleventh Circuit’s
recent en banc votes seem to reflect some internal concern over potential
abuse of the unpublication shortcut. Although the vast majority of the
Eleventh Circuit’s en banc votes since 2015 have involved published
176

140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964, 965 (2018) (noting that the
decision in an earlier published case foreclosed the argument that Title VII protected plaintiff from
discrimination because of sexual orientation), rev’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731.
178 See, e.g., Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 781 F. App’x 824, 832 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that a
claim for nominal damages in a religious-freedom case did not avoid mootness concerns), rev’d, 141 S.
Ct. 792 (2021); United States v. Manrique, 618 F. App’x 579, 582–83 (11th Cir. 2015) (clarifying
jurisdictional rules related to deferred order of restitution and timely filing of notice of appeal), aff’d,
137 S. Ct. 1266 (2017).
177
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decisions, there were seven votes in unpublished decisions,179 including a
vote in a controversial police-involved shooting and qualified immunity
decision in which, after argument, the panel disposed of the appeal in a
single-paragraph unpublished decision. 180 (I should note that the panel’s
decision in Bostock was among the seven en banc votes, too.)181 The plural
of anecdote is not data, of course, but it is telling that such a decision received
circuit-wide recognition—and indeed even provoked a published, reasoned
response from some of the original panel members.182
All of this underscores what Professor Resnik has suggested: at a
minimum, there appears to be some “disjuncture between what lower courts
understand to be cases of legal significance and what four members of the
Supreme Court believe worthy of review.” 183 That raises, in Professor
Resnik’s view, “puzzles about how federal appellate judges decide (or
bargain) over unpublication.”184 Is this evidence of inconsistent application
of publication criteria across the circuits? Perhaps—especially because
almost all circuits share essentially the same basic standard for determining
publication worthiness.185 Is this evidence of “strategic publication”186—that
is, use of unpublication to shield favorable and unfavorable legal rules from
further review (by colleagues or a higher court)? Again, perhaps.
To make more than tentative conclusions, we’d need to know more
about the inputs, including, for example, the relative rates of seeking
certiorari review from unpublished versus published decisions. One might
expect the rate for seeking certiorari to be higher for published decisions,
given that published decisions make law and unpublished decisions do not.
On its face, it would be hard for a nonprecedential decision to satisfy the
Supreme Court’s standard for review—a standard that requires “compelling
reasons” for the grant of certiorari, including importance, conflict with

179

Data are derived from En Banc Poll Orders, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE 11TH CIR., https://
www.ca11.uscourts.gov/enbanc-poll-orders [https://perma.cc/A9FN-MUEL], and are on file with author.
180 Young v. Borders, 620 F. App’x 889, 890 (11th Cir. 2015).
181 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 894 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2018) (denying rehearing en
banc).
182 See Young v. Borders, 850 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en banc).
183 Resnik Testimony, supra note 173, at 20.
184 Id.
185 See Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing
Publication and Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 349, 351–56 (2004)
(culling circuit-specific publication rules).
186 See generally Ben Grunwald, Strategic Publication, 92 TUL. L. REV. 745, 759–60 (2018)
(demonstrating that panels that disagree may bargain for publication or unpublication strategically).
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another court, or a significant departure from judicial norms. 187 Decisions
that make no law, by definition, cannot create a real conflict in precedent
because they do not bind. They also can’t be all that important—except to
the parties themselves, of course. And if they represent such a significant
“depart[ure] from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings”188
to call for the Supreme Court to use its supervisory powers, well, then, that’s
reason enough to rethink the enterprise.
That the Supreme Court—or at least four Justices on the Court—see fit
to review any nonprecedential decision is at least some sign that the triage
system isn’t working quite as it is supposed to work (at least not all of the
time). In an ideal world, no unpublished decisions should ever meet the
criteria for certiorari worthiness set out in Supreme Court Rule 10. Those
cases relegated to the second tier of federal appellate review are supposed to
be the easy ones about which there is little to no room for disagreement over
the correctness of the outcome. If it is otherwise, then these cases deserve
more attention. Whatever we are to make of the rate of Supreme Court
review of unpublished decisions, it is at least evidence that the Supreme
Court isn’t ignoring unpublished decisions—the product of the underbelly of
the U.S. Courts of Appeals—and neither should we.
2. Convenience and Judicial Preference
The triage system emboldens judges to be picky. They choose which
appeals are worthy of their attention and which are not. That’s an invitation
that can be misused and abused. And it is difficult to assess such misuse or
abuse because of the volume of appellate activity and the difficulty of finding
it all.189 To the extent that the Supreme Court reviews a nontrivial number of
unpublished decisions each year, that is some quantitative evidence of
misuse or abuse. This Section considers these risks qualitatively.
Judges tend to defend their selective distribution of appellate resources
as a matter of efficiency. For example, the current chief judge of the Eleventh
Circuit once observed that providing full process for certain categories of
cases—“routine cases based on settled precedent,” such as “petitions to
187 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (explaining that a petition for a writ of certiorari “will be granted only for
compelling reasons,” which include where (1) a U.S. court of appeals “has entered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another” U.S. court of appeals “on the same important matter,” (2) a U.S. court of
appeals is in conflict with a state court of last resort, (3) a U.S. court of appeals “has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as
to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power,” or (4) a U.S. court of appeals “has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by” the Supreme Court).
188 Id.
189 See McAlister, supra note 8, at 1126–32 (explaining that unpublished decisions remain “missing”
from commercial legal databases despite technological innovations and legal reforms providing for
access).
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review deportations and denials of Social Security benefits”—“would only
delay decisions that should be speedy.”190 This judge suggests that shortcut
procedures are in the interests of the litigants themselves—downplaying,
perhaps, how such procedures are also easier for the judges.
Less charitably—and perhaps more revealingly—another judge
appeared to acknowledge the judicial motivation for continued reliance on
shortcuts. The former chief judge of the Fifth Circuit said the federal
judiciary was at risk of getting “dumbed-down” if it had to focus too much
on the “overwhelming number of routine or trivial appeals”; that judge
observed, “The situation is like that of a competitive tennis player forced to
spend the bulk of his time rallying with novices.”191 The triage system thus
ensures that judges can keep their skills sharp by working only on the hard
cases that truly deserve their attention. The court’s staff, on the other hand,
can spend their time “rallying with novices.”192
The system of appellate justice that has emerged—one of selective
distribution of appellate resources—is no longer a needed response to a
crisis. There is no longer any correlation between caseload volume and the
use of unpublished decisions193 that are a hallmark of the second-tier federal
appellate system. The federal appellate caseload has fallen since its highwater mark in 2005, yet the number of unpublished decisions continued to
increase until leveling off at around 87% to 88% nationwide in the last five
years.194 Because of that trend, the use of unpublished decisions no longer
correlates with caseload volume—the stated cause of the need to rely on
unpublished adjudications in the first place 195 —but it does positively
correlate with a rise in pro se or unrepresented appeals.196 Across the country,
the number of pro se appellants has risen in the last two decades from around
40% to around 50%.197 Correlation does not equal causation, but caseload
volume alone can no longer account for the continued reliance on
unpublished decisions. Consider this: in 1992, when the U.S. Courts of

190

William H. Pryor, Jr., Conservatives Should Oppose Expanding the Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/conservatives-expanding-federal-courts.
html [https://perma.cc/PM23-Y8SU].
191 Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by
Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1493 (1995) (reviewing BAKER, supra note 26).
192 Id.
193 See McAlister, supra note 27, at 554 fig.5 (showing a lack of correlation between caseload
volume and reliance on unpublished decisions).
194 Id. at 550 fig.1.
195 See supra notes 65–76 and accompanying text (discussing the need for unpublished decisions).
196 See McAlister, supra note 27, at 555 fig.6.
197 See id. at 558 fig.9; see also id. at 555–58 (discussing the rise in pro se litigation and the positive
correlation between that increase and the continued and increasing reliance on unpublished decisions).
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Appeals heard around 48,000 appeals (roughly the volume they hear
today 198 ), the courts were publishing approximately 29% of their work
nationwide.199 Recently, they have published only 13%.200
Let’s consider another possibility: the courts simply like the procedures
they’ve adopted. These procedures—the ability, in essence, to operate as
choosy courts of last resort and not workmanlike courts of mandatory
jurisdiction201 —have freed federal appellate judges from the need to deal
closely with the humdrum of routine work. They can instead spend their time
and energy on more “important” cases—however one defines important.
From a human-labor perspective, that makes sense. Like any of us, judges
desire to make their jobs more interesting, more fun, or—more cynically—
easier and less work.202 Judges, after all, are workers.203 But they are workers
in what is essentially a dead-end job, and we should consider their behavior
in that context.204 (Of course, there’s no more glorious dead-end job than
being a judge on a U.S. court of appeals—except, perhaps, being a Justice
on the U.S. Supreme Court.)
198 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-1 (48,190 appeals commenced); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2019,
at tbl.B-1 (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b1_0930.2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ET2T-DWMB] (48,486 appeals commenced).
199 In 1992, there were 47,013 new appeals filed in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Michael C. Gizzi,
Examining the Crisis of Volume in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 96, 96 (1993). That year,
the nationwide rate of unpublished opinions was 71.7%. Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished
Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 204 (2001).
200 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-12.
201 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 118 (“[M]andatory review [in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals] has . . . come to mean something quite different [as a result of the triage procedures]. Now the
trial court’s decision is subject to review at the discretion of the judges . . . .”). But see Levy, Judging,
supra note 36, at 2402 (observing, in response, that this argument may contain some “hyperbole” and that
appellate judges are still involved—albeit to a lesser extent—in resolving second-tier cases on the merits).
202 See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 36–37 (2013) (“Especially as
judges age, and either their energy wanes or boredom sets in, or they realize that further effort will do
little to alter their career achievements or reputation, we can expect them to delegate more of their work
to law clerks and other staff . . . .”); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Gresham’s Law Revisited: Expedited
Processing Techniques and the Allocation of Appellate Resources, 6 JUST. SYS. J. 372, 372 (1981)
(finding, based on an analysis of one state intermediate appellate court, that appellate resources generally
will be allocated for civil appeals, rather than criminal appeals, for a host of reasons and irrespective of
the incidence of “frivolous” criminal appeals).
203 See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 202, at 25–26 (theorizing judicial behavior through lens of “the
judge as a participant in a labor market—that is, as a worker”—and arguing that “the most fruitful theory
to guide empirical study of judicial behavior is one of self-interested behavior, broadly understood, in a
labor-market setting”). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 7 (2008) (advancing a
labor-market hypothesis for understanding judges as workers).
204 See Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 455, 456
(1999) (“[B]ecause of the pyramidal structure of the federal judiciary, the typical judge’s chance of
promotion is so low that it is unlikely that desire for promotion affects the decisions of more than a
handful of judges.”).
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Enter, then, “meritless appeals.”205 The specter of meritless appeals, and
the sense that the federal courts are awash in useless, boring, and frivolous
work, is a trope that supports the maintenance of the two-tiered system itself.
Federal judges have said for decades that meritless appeals are a major
problem. 206 That the federal appellate courts were beset with meritless
appeals first emerged as a narrative in the 1960s207—a boom time, perhaps
not coincidentally, for federal civil and criminal constitutional and statutory
rights as well.208 Indeed, the term “meritless” was used just twenty-five times
in the federal appellate courts’ available decisions issued before 1960.209 It
has been used in more than 27,000 decisions since the beginning of 1960.210
Just because an appellant may not win doesn’t mean a case is unworthy
of judicial attention—or that it is worthy of being branded with the derisive
label “meritless.” Almost all appeals in the federal system are losers. The
average annual outright reversal rate across the geographic circuit courts is
less than 9%. 211 And fewer than 1% of appeals earn a remand—another
favorable result.212 Few of us would defend a system that bestows meaningful
judicial scrutiny on fewer than 10% of filed appeals.213 And yet, that is the
process we have in some of the circuit courts.
We too often use “meritless” to denote “frivolous.” But those should be
distinct concepts, as Professor Alexander Reinert has convincingly argued in
the most substantial work to date on meritless litigation.214 Professor Reinert
In the trial court context, Professor Resnik has explored how the label “housekeeping” (and that
term’s use) has had a similar expressive effect to identify low-value (and gendered) work. See Judith
Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909,
916, 933 (1990).
206 See Martin, supra note 18, at 181–82 (identifying little-merit appeals as a major problem affecting
the federal appeals courts).
207 Surely there were meritless appeals filed well before the 1960s—and possibly many of them—
but they did not enter the judicial and scholarly conscience in the way we think of them today. See, e.g.,
Pether, supra note 15, at 1449–51, 1450 n.65 (tracing the early history of unpublished decisions as a
response to the onslaught of criminal and civil rights claims perceived to be meritless).
208 See McAlister, supra note 27, at 543–44 (discussing the relationship between unpublished
decisions, appellate caseload growth, and the expansion of federally created rights).
209 To obtain this number, I searched Westlaw’s federal appellate courts’ database for the word
“meritless” using a date range for decisions issued before 1960.
210 To obtain this number, I searched Westlaw’s federal appellate courts’ database for the word
“meritless” using a date range for each decade after 1960 (because searching multiple decades sometimes
exceeded Westlaw’s limit on 10,000 returned database hits).
211 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-5.
212
Id.
213 One can also see a chicken-and-egg problem: is the reversal rate so low because the courts are
misers with their time, or have the courts been appropriately shrewd given the paucity of meaty issues?
214 Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J.
1191, 1198–1201 (2014) (explaining that frivolous cases are those “based on a conception of the law that
205
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argues that courts, Congress, and scholars alike have elided the difference
between frivolous and meritless litigation—and they have done so to the
judicial system’s detriment. By substantially undervaluing meritless
litigation, courts and Congress have promoted reforms that stymie legal
innovation and undermine efforts to use the legal system as a neutral forum
for dispute resolution. 215 Put succinctly, our system ultimately needs and
depends on meritless appeals to define and develop the contours of legal
rules. It can do without frivolous work that wastes judicial time with
outlandish and unsupportable requests, but it needs meritless litigation for
the system to function well.
Take, for example, a claim by a prisoner that the state’s failure to
provide treatment for their gender dysphoria violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Such a claim
requires the prisoner to establish that the state has acted with “deliberate
indifference to [a] serious medical need[].” 216 Had the prisoner sought
treatment in 1976 when the U.S. Supreme Court announced that standard, or
shortly thereafter, the claim would have been seen as frivolous as a matter of
existing law—because gender dysphoria (or any analogous condition) would
not have been considered a serious medical need at that time. 217 The
diagnosis didn’t even exist yet.218 Today, there is a circuit split over whether
the failure to treat gender dysphoria with gender affirmation surgery violates
the Eighth Amendment. 219 That example underscores Professor Reinert’s
point: “patently unsuccessful litigation can contribute to positive legal
change.” 220 Full process and consideration may hasten that innovation,
is both unsupported and unsupportable under any existing principle” or “based on allegations of
outlandish facts”).
215 See id. at 1226–30 (arguing that meritless litigation has value because meritless cases (1) can be
“necessary to the development of a doctrine,” (2) can “prompt more direct change in the law,” including
from congressional responses, (3) can inform “proper institutional conduct and behavior,” and (4) can
“produce stability” by reducing the risk that parties “resort to disruptive self-help”).
216 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
217 See, e.g., Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 564 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A serious medical need is
one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a
lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” (quoting Mann v. Taser Int’l,
Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2009))).
218 The diagnosis of “transsexualism” first appeared in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders in 1980; in 1994, that diagnosis was replaced with “gender identity disorder in adults
and adolescence” to reduce stigma. See Gender Dysphoria Diagnosis, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Nov.
2017), https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/cultural-competency/education/transgender-and-gendernonconforming-patients/gender-dysphoria-diagnosis [https://perma.cc/8L2P-PN4Y].
219 Compare Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 803 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that a prisoner
established deliberate indifference to medical needs for the failure of the prison to provide gender
confirmation surgery), with Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 221–28 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting similar
claim on the basis that there is no medical consensus on proper treatment for gender dysphoria).
220 Reinert, supra note 214, at 1193.
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whereas perpetual second-tier treatment can stymie it. And, sometimes, even
what may initially seem frivolous evolves too. All this to say, it’s easy to be
casual with the labels “meritless” and “frivolous,” and there are likely few
truly frivolous (in the sense of legally and factually silly) appeals (outside
of, perhaps, claims about aliens, sovereign citizens, and the like).
Scholars and judges alike have often devalued and dismissed the output
of the second-tier appellate system as meritless to justify the selective
distribution of appellate resources. For example, in their major empirical and
theoretical work examining the behavior of federal judges, Professors Lee
Epstein, William Landes, and then-Judge Richard Posner decided not to
include unpublished decisions in their study (a sizeable omission, of
course).221 They did so because “[t]he vast majority of unpublished decisions
are affirmances, and . . . this is a reflection of the signal lack of merit of most
cases filed in the federal district courts.”222 At the same time, however, the
authors argued that even though these “meritless” cases occupy a “majority”
of judges’ time “in some of the busier circuits, . . . it is not their principal
work.”223 The principal work, in their view, is the fun stuff—the cases of
consequence in which legal rules are made and shaped. The authors compare
judges to artists like T.S. Eliot and Lawrence Olivier, who may have spent
most of their waking hours doing drudge work. 224 So too with judges.
Epstein, Landes, and Posner aren’t alone in thinking of the work of judges
in these terms—that’s the attitude reflected in the candid assessment from
the Eleventh Circuit and Fifth Circuit judges discussed above.225
But judges aren’t artists or actors (or competitive tennis players);
they’re public servants. And doing the drudge work is a public service. It
may be that courts rightly triaged their time and attention in a time of
scarcity. That’s the point of triage: those with life-threatening injuries who
can be treated go first; those with needs that exceed available resources and
for whom efforts would be futile go last. 226 But it need not be a time of
scarcity anymore: Congress can respond to the persistent failure to distribute
federal appellate resources more fairly, and, in so doing, it can incentivize
221 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 202, at 55. That choice led to some criticism of the work. See Renée
Cohn Jubelirer, The Behavior of Federal Judges: The “Careerist” in Robes, 97 JUDICATURE 98, 103–04
(2013).
222 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 202, at 55.
223 Id. at 56.
224 Id. at 55–56.
225 See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text (discussing candid observations from federal
appellate judges about the nature of unpublished decisions).
226 See, e.g., Katharyn Kennedy, Richard V. Aghababian, Lucille Gans & C. Phuli Lewis, Triage:
Techniques and Applications in Decisionmaking, 28 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 136, 138 (1996)
(describing triage systems in the historical, military, and mass-casualty contexts).
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the courts to provide more and better process to more litigants. Before
turning to one proposed solution—adding more judges—the next Section
considers additional costs of the uneven distribution of federal appellate
resources.
B. Disparate Impact of the Triage System
Across Geographic Circuits
Not all circuits use the triage procedures described in Part I to the same
extent. Some circuits continue to rely more heavily on oral argument than
others, and some circuits issue substantially more published decisions than
others. We might reasonably expect some variation across the circuits. But
as Professors Richman and Reynolds observed, it is unlikely that “caseload
differences, either in number or kind, account for the[se] differences.” 227
Although some “experimentation” might be “tolerable,” courts aren’t really
experimenting—they’re just doing things differently for “no apparent
reason,” thus “mocking the notion of equal treatment under the law.”228
This Section argues that those inexplicable differences have a disparate
impact based on race and, to a lesser extent, class. First, it evaluates the
differences in how the courts distribute their available resources (that is, how
they distribute oral argument and publication). Next, it considers the extent
to which the different inputs (docket composition) may affect different
procedural outputs (oral argument and published decisions). Finally, it
examines how variations in the distribution of Article III resources correlate
with race- and class-based differences across the circuits. Circuits with the
largest per capita population of Black Americans rely most heavily on
second-tier procedures, whereas circuit courts in the wealthiest regions rely
the least on such processes. This is especially the case with the procedural
shortcut of a nonargument track. As a result, the disparate distribution of
judicial time and attention appears to impose a greater burden on our most
vulnerable communities.
1. How the Courts of Appeals Distribute Their Resources
Each circuit has an underbelly. Every circuit relies to some extent on
second-tier appellate processes. To assess that underbelly, we can consider
the extent to which the courts use the constituent parts of that process, such
as unpublished decisions and summary or nonargument procedures.
Unpublication often, but not always, reflects a second-tier process.
(Some appeals argued orally will end in unpublished decisions, but most will
be published.) Nationwide, the unpublication rate for all merits terminations
227
228

RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 94.
Id.
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in the geographic courts of appeals has hovered in the high-80% range since
2013.229 But unpublication is uneven across the circuits. At the high end, the
Fourth Circuit has a five-year mean unpublication rate of 93.7%, followed
closely by the Eleventh Circuit at 93.3% and the Ninth Circuit at 93.0%. At
the low end, the D.C., First, and Seventh Circuits have five-year means
below 67%. Table 3 provides unpublication rates for the last five years, as
well as a five-year mean, for each geographic circuit.
TABLE 3: UNPUBLICATION RATES OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS
Circuit
D.C. Cir.
1st Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.
4th Cir.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.

2020
60.1%
71.7%
88.3%
89.9%
93.1%
86.5%
87.6%
66.1%
78.2%
93.3%
81.7%
91.5%

2019
64.3%
69.2%
89.1%
90.5%
91.8%
87.7%
88.0%
64.7%
74.5%
93.2%
81.2%
93.5%

2018
60.9%
63.6%
90.5%
90.8%
93.9%
90.7%
91.4%
63.7%
79.1%
93.1%
80.0%
92.8%

2017
52.8%
63.6%
91.7%
89.1%
93.4%
91.0%
92.6%
65.2%
78.2%
93.3%
78.5%
93.9%

2016
61.8%
65.4%
90.4%
93.0%
96.3%
90.4%
90.6%
69.8%
75.0%
92.3%
85.1%
94.6%

Five-Year Mean
60.0%
66.7%
90.0%
90.7%
93.7%
89.3%
90.0%
66.0%
77.0%
93.0%
81.3%
93.3%

Note. The mean of all circuits equals 82.6%, and the standard deviation equals 12.2%. Red circuits are
above the five-year mean, and green circuits are below it.

The use of oral argument has similarly been low over this same stretch
of time. Nationwide, the total percentage of merits terminations after oral
argument has hovered around 20% annually since 2012.230 Table 4 identifies
229 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-12 (87.0%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2019, at tbl.B-12,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TYE4JMW] (87.0%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2018, at tbl.B-12, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW26-E9C5] (88.2%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017,
at tbl.B-12, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9R7D-ER67] (88.2%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2016, at tbl.B-12, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/data_tables/jb_b12_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7SW-8P2F] (88.7%); JUDICIAL
BUSINESS 2015, at tbl.B-12, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/B12Sep15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CNB-5RQH] (87.0%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, at tbl.B-12, https://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/B12Sep14.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q92-ZGAR] (87.7%);
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2013, at tbl.B-12, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/
S03Sep13.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A2E-Y6YN] (88.2%).
230 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-10 (19.3%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2019, at tbl.B-10, https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b10_0930.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/83FN-HJHS]
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the percentage of appeals terminated after oral argument over the last five
years in each of the geographic circuits, as well as the five-year means. As
with rates of unpublished decisions, there’s significant variation in the use
of oral argument across the circuits; the chart highlights in red those circuits
below the national five-year mean and highlights in green those circuits
above the national five-year mean.
TABLE 4: ORAL-ARGUMENT RATES OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS231
Circuit
D.C. Cir.
1st Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.
4th Cir.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.

2020
45.5%
23.7%
35.3%
11.4%
8.1%
22.9%
13.5%
37.2%
16.2%
19.0%
25.6%
11.2%

2019
45.1%
21.5%
34.7%
12.6%
11.4%
22.0%
15.2%
39.1%
18.5%
21.0%
27.4%
11.0%

2018
47.2%
26.2%
33.3%
11.0%
10.2%
18.7%
13.3%
41.8%
16.3%
23.0%
29.0%
10.9%

2017
51.6%
27.2%
32.4%
13.9%
10.5%
16.4%
12.0%
37.5%
15.5%
20.6%
27.9%
10.4%

2016
46.0%
27.6%
31.3%
9.3%
5.9%
17.0%
15.0%
30.4%
17.0%
23.2%
21.1%
7.7%

Five-Year Mean
47.0%
25.2%
33.4%
11.6%
9.2%
19.4%
13.8%
37.2%
16.7%
21.3%
26.2%
10.2%

Note. The mean of all circuits equals 22.6%, and the standard deviation equals 11.8%. Red circuits are
below the five-year mean, and green circuits are above it.

Although more appeals receive oral argument nationwide than end in
unpublished decisions, the two are generally related. That means that most
circuits with the highest publication rates also have the highest oral-argument
rates, and those courts with the highest unpublication rates have the lowest
oral-argument rates. The two procedures go hand in hand: judges don’t
(20.4%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2018, at tbl.B-10, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
jb_b10_0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZVY-CENX] (20.1%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017, at tbl.B-10,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b10_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW9X
-F57X] (18.8%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2016, at tbl.B-10, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data_tables/jb_b10_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/798A-9SHB] (17.5%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015, at
tbl.B-10, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/B10Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS48NPG3] (20.5%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, at tbl.B-10, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
statistics_import_dir/B10Sep14.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7CG-B6RR] (19.5%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2013,
at tbl.S-1, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/S01Sep13.pdf [https://
perma.cc/DE5V-UNVV] (19.6%); JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2012, at tbl.S-1, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/statistics_import_dir/S01Sep12.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWB2-U8VV] (18.8%).
231 Data are derived from JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-10. For a discussion of the Judicial
Business reports as the only data the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts publishes on publication
status and which “focuses on ‘merits’ terminations,” see McAlister, supra note 8, at 1120.
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expect to invest much time in cases that will not make law, and these
supposedly easier cases do not benefit from oral argument. Figure 1
demonstrates the strong inverse correlation232 between the unpublication rate
and the rate of oral argument across the circuits: as the unpublication rate
rises, the rate of oral argument generally falls. There are some exceptions—
in particular, in the Second Circuit—in which a strong tradition for oral
argument (even for pro se litigants) persists. 233 But in other circuits,
publication and oral argument are explicitly linked. For example, until the
COVID-19 pandemic,234 the Fourth Circuit would only publish decisions in
appeals that received oral argument. 235 But overall, the strong inverse
correlation between the rate of unpublished decisions and the use of oral
argument is what we would expect given the efficiency goals that
unpublication and reduced oral argument serve.

232

Figures 1–8 present the results of linear regression fits using the Excel LINEST function, which
returns a slope and intercept along with the square of the Pearson correlation coefficient R. The values of
R are given in footnotes for each of the figures. The qualitative adjectival degrees of the correlation of
strong, moderate, weak, etc., are rather arbitrary. That said, this Article follows the approach of JACOB
COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 82 (2d ed. 1988), which defines
the broad boundaries of 0.1 < |R| < 0.3, 0.3 < |R| <0.5, and 0.5 < |R| to imply weak, moderate, and strong
correlation, respectively.
233 See Levy, Mechanics, supra note 91, at 369 (“Judge Newman of the Second Circuit has noted
that his court gives particular weight to oral argument, explaining that until the creation of [a special track
to handle influx of immigration appeals], the circuit ‘prided itself as the last remaining circuit to afford
oral argument to all litigants, with the exception of prisoners whose cases [had] been deemed of
insufficient merit to warrant the appointment of counsel.’” (quoting Newman, supra note 34, at 433)).
234 Notice of Further Amendment to Standing Order 20-01 (4th Cir. Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.
ca4.uscourts.gov/docs/pdfs/secondamendedstandingorder20-01.pdf?sfvrsn=7a34ba09 [https://perma.cc/
8FPK-R4SF].
235 4TH CIR. LOC. R. 36(a) (“The Court will publish opinions only in cases that have been fully
briefed and presented at oral argument.”).
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FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORAL-ARGUMENT AND UNPUBLICATION RATES (2020)236
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Thus, nationwide, over the past five years, only about 20% of appeals
were argued orally and only about 13% ended in published decisions. Those
are rough but reasonably fair proxies for the size of the first and second tiers
of the federal appellate justice system. The first tier comprises roughly 20%
of cases; the second tier is the bottom 80%. In any one circuit, the first tier
might be smaller (perhaps 10% or less in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits)
or larger (more like 35% in the Seventh Circuit).
Finally, bringing data from Tables 3 and 4 together gives us a clearer
sense of which circuits devote more judicial attention to a greater percentage
of their dockets based on relative oral-argument and publication rates. Table
5 combines oral-argument and publication data and sorts each circuit from
best to worst (highest oral-argument rate to lowest; lowest unpublication rate
to highest) based on five-year means (and where the bold dividing line
reflects the mean). Four circuits emerge as above average: the D.C., First,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. Conversely, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits
are consistently below average.

236 The Pearson correlation value for the data presented in Figure 1 is 0.62, implying strong
correlation. See supra note 232.
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TABLE 5: ORAL-ARGUMENT AND UNPUBLICATION
RATES BY CIRCUIT (USING FIVE-YEAR MEANS)
Oral-Argument Rates
D.C. Cir.
47.1%
7th Cir.
37.2%
2d Cir.
33.4%
10th Cir.
26.2%
1st Cir.
25.2%

Unpublication Rates
D.C. Cir.
60.0%
7th Cir.
65.9%
1st Cir.
66.7%
8th Cir.
77.0%
10th Cir.
81.3%

9th Cir.
5th Cir.
8th Cir.
3d Cir.
6th Cir.
11th Cir.
4th Cir.

5th Cir.
2d Cir.
6th Cir.
3d Cir.
9th Cir.
11th Cir.
4th Cir.

21.4%
19.4%
16.7%
11.6%
13.8%
10.2%
9.2%

89.3%
90.0%
90.0%
90.7%
93.0%
93.3%
93.7%

Whether these differences affect outcomes is a difficult—and perhaps
impossible—question to answer. Is a prisoner who files a civil rights claim
in the Fourth Circuit more likely to lose than a prisoner who files the same
claim under similar circumstances in the Seventh Circuit? At the very least,
we might expect the Seventh Circuit prisoner to be more likely to have his
case heard by the court orally, and intuitively, we might expect a court that
devotes more judicial attention to a greater percentage of appeals to have
results that are more favorable to the appellant more of the time.237 And the
data appear to support that intuition—at least in so far as there may be some
relationship between the use of oral argument and favorable outcomes on
appeal.238 Figure 2 demonstrates a moderately positive correlation across the
circuits between favorable results (either reversal or remand) in cases
terminated on the merits and the rate of oral argument. (Of course, if a court

237
See Haworth, supra note 33, at 320 (“Probably no appellate judge believes that sixty percent of
the cases on his court’s docket can be decided without oral argument without some mistakes being
made . . . .”). See generally Huang, supra note 16, at 1114–15 (finding that reversal rates fell in
nonprisoner civil cases as Second and Ninth Circuits diverted attention to handle an overwhelming
volume of immigration appeals).
238 The correlation between favorable outcomes and publication rate is weak; the Pearson correlation
value is 0.2, compared with 0.42 for the relationship between oral argument and favorable outcomes. See
infra note 239 (discussing correlation between oral argument and favorable outcomes). That fact—
coupled with the positive correlation in Figure 2—may suggest that oral argument is a more significant
factor in litigant success than the decision to publish a particular outcome. For reasons discussed above,
cases that go to oral argument are more likely to receive significant judicial attention while preparing for
oral argument, even if the decision is not ultimately published. See supra Figure 1; infra notes 242–244
and accompanying text.
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thinks more cases raise sticky issues meriting oral argument, it follows that
more such cases would end in favorable outcomes for the appellant, too.)
FIGURE 2: RATES OF ORAL ARGUMENT AGAINST FAVORABLE OUTCOMES ON APPEAL239
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Underscoring that the amount of attention matters, Professor Copus’s
recent work argues against the categorical treatment of certain appeals as
presumptively not deserving of judicial attention. 240 He uses predictive
algorithms to identify likelihood of error and the need for lawmaking in casespecific contexts to help better deploy resources in the triage process.241 His
case study (based on the Ninth Circuit) demonstrates that the courts may be
underappreciating the risk of error in pro se appeals.242 Although many pro
se appeals have low degrees of error, Professor Copus says approximately
10% of pro se appeals have error rates in the range of other lawyered civil
appeals.243 Considering that pro se appeals account for approximately 50%
239 Figure 2 compares data on oral argument from JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-10, with data
on the number of reversals and vacaturs in merits terminations from id. tbl.B-5. To obtain the percentage
of “favorable outcomes” described in this Figure, I divided the number of reversals and vacaturs by the
total merits terminations for the reporting year. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing
the description of correlation). The Pearson correlation value for the data presented in Figure 2 is 0.42,
implying moderate correlation. See supra note 232.
240 Copus, supra note 164, at 654 (arguing against the categorical treatment of pro se appeals as
presumptively meritless).
241 See id. at 618.
242 See id. at 611 (developing “a system of statistical precedent” that can help judges better predict
when to deploy their error-correcting and lawmaking functions “based on finely tuned patterns
automatically mined from large-scale datasets of previous decisions”).
243 Id. at 654.
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of the appellate workload,244 10% is a nontrivial amount. Based on his work,
Professor Copus unsurprisingly concludes that he sees “little justification for
assigning [all pro se appeals] to staff attorneys” based on an assumption that
they are easy affirmances or meritless.245
The extent of process may indeed matter—and not just to the litigant
who desires her day in court, but also to the outcome on appeal. Appellants
appear more likely to obtain a favorable result where the court gives the
appellant oral argument and, therefore, more Article III attention. How a
court chooses to distribute Article III resources, therefore, may affect an
appeal’s fate. If that’s true—if the extent of process matters instrumentally
as well as intrinsically—then we should be especially attuned to the
unevenness of how those procedures are being distributed. I turn to that
question next after first explaining why docket composition alone cannot
justify disparate circuit practices.
2. Docket Composition Across the Courts of Appeals
Any uneven distribution of appellate resources might reflect different
docket demands across the country. Perhaps one circuit court (such as, say,
the D.C. Circuit) sees more complex cases than another circuit. Although we
would not expect the identity of the appealing party alone to determine the
extent of the processes afforded,246 it’s possible that some types of appeals,
on average, demand more attention while other types of appeals, on average,
demand less. At the district court level, for example, the courts weigh various
filings based on expected resource demands and relative complexity. 247
Although we have no similar metric for appellate cases, it’s reasonable to
think docket composition might have something to do with how different
courts distribute their resources differently.
But that is not what is happening—at least not for the most part.
Although there are some notable exceptions (discussed below), most of the
twelve geographic courts of appeals see roughly the same kinds of appeals
in roughly the same percentages. Appendix A provides five-year averages

244

JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-9.
Copus, supra note 161, at 654.
246 See Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal
Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 310 (1990) (“While some groups of appellants may
be statistically more likely to bring appeals which have less merit than those brought by other types of
appellants, the identification of the appellant per se should make no difference.”).
247 See CAROL L. KRAFKA & PATRICIA A. LOMBARD, FED. JUD. CTR., 2003–2004 DISTRICT COURT
CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL RESOURCES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 2 (2005),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CaseWts0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZFN-KJFP] (explaining
case weights).
245
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for docket composition in each circuit, and Table 6 details the nationwide
five-year averages for docket composition:
TABLE 6: FIVE-YEAR MEAN DOCKET COMPOSITION ACROSS ALL GEOGRAPHIC CIRCUITS248
Appeals Categories
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency
Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean of Means
20.3%
9.3%
6.3%
15.1%
23.2%
1.3%

Standard Deviation
7.8%
2.8%
5.7%
6.0%
6.1%
0.7%

11.2%

10.2%

13.2%

3.3%

This Table shows that there is relatively high variability in some categories
of appeals—administrative agency and criminal appeals have the largest
standard deviations—and relatively consistent volumes of bankruptcy and
U.S. prisoner appeals and original proceedings across the circuits.
As Appendix A demonstrates, only the D.C., First, and Second Circuits
exceed two standard deviations from the mean in any one of these eight broad
categories. The D.C. Circuit’s docket composition is the most unusual—and
the clearest outlier among the geographic circuits. For administrative appeals
and nonprisoner U.S. civil appeals, it exceeds two standard deviations on the
high end, and for private (that is, nonfederal) prisoner appeals, it exceeds two
standard deviations on the low end. The D.C. Circuit also exceeds (either
above or below) one standard deviation (but is within two standard
deviations) in every remaining appeal category except for U.S. prisoner

248 For this Table, I averaged the docket-composition data for the last five consecutive reporting
years. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-1; JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2019, at tbl.B-1; JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2018, at tbl.B-1, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b1_0930.2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9QWB-FWHP]; JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017, at tbl.B-1, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/data_tables/jb_b1_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/99FG-3X4W]; JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2016, at
tbl.B-1, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b1_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M334-LHUB]. I calculated the percentage composition for each geographic circuit court in each category
for each year, and I averaged those results for each court over the five-year period. I then averaged all
twelve geographic courts to create mean nationwide docket-composition numbers from which I calculated
the standard deviation. Note that “private” simply refers to prisoners not held by federal authority (and
thus captures filings by those in custody under state and local law). See, e.g., James C. Martin & Susan
M. Freeman, Wither Oral Argument? The American Academy of Appellate Lawyers Says Let’s Resurrect
It!, 19 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 89, 114 (2018) (observing that term “private” in Administrative Office
statistics “refers to prisoners held by state and local, not U.S., authorities”).
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petitions, where it is close to the national average. For these reasons, I
generally exclude the D.C. Circuit from my disparate impact analysis.249 Its
docket composition is sufficiently different from its peer circuits that we
might expect it to process appeals differently, irrespective of any
demographic influences in its limited geographic footprint.
The First and Second Circuits are also outliers in one category each.
The First Circuit sees a significantly greater percentage of bankruptcy
appeals than its sister circuits, but the overall numbers of such appeals are
slight (ranging from 28 to 44 bankruptcy appeals over the last five years).250
The Second Circuit—surely owing to its location in major business centers—
sees a greater percentage of private civil cases than any of its sister circuits.
These are distinctions to consider, but I do not think either justifies excluding
these circuits from the analysis to follow in Section II.B.3.251
Except for these three circuits—the D.C., First, and Second Circuits—
no other circuit exceeds two standard deviations with respect to any category
of appeals based on five-year means. Most courts exceed one standard
deviation in at least one category, however. Only two circuits are perfectly
average and within a single standard deviation in each category: the Third
Circuit and the Tenth Circuit.
Because there is a correlation between unpublished decisions and the
volume of appeals filed by pro se litigants,252 the relative volume of pro se
litigation across the circuits may affect the extent to which a circuit uses
second-tier procedures. Table 7 identifies the average volume of pro se
appeals filed over the last five years for each geographic circuit. Those
highlighted in green are at least one standard deviation below the mean,
while those highlighted in red are at least one standard deviation above the
mean. Three circuits—the D.C., First, and Second Circuits, the same three

249 Excluding the D.C. Circuit in studies of judicial behavior and the effects of triage decisions is not
uncommon. See, e.g., Songer, supra note 246, at 310 (“The District of Columbia Circuit was not included
in the comparison because the nature of the issues litigated before it are not comparable to those litigated
in the numbered circuits.”). Further, I have excluded data from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which has a distinct jurisdiction and a nationwide scope. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295. It does not hear
appeals in criminal, prisoner, or immigration matters—categories of appeals that dominate the second tier
of federal appellate process.
250 For data from each respective reporting year, see table B-1 of each of the 2016–2020 installments
of Judicial Business cited supra note 248.
251 Because the volume of bankruptcy appellate activity is, overall, slight, it is hard to justify
excluding the First Circuit on this basis. It may be more tempting to see the Second Circuit as an outlier,
given the volume of private civil cases it sees, but it also has a large volume of immigration litigation that
offsets that large amount of first-tier appellate work. See Newman, supra note 34, at 429 (discussing
demands on the Second Circuit from a “flood” of immigration appeals).
252 See supra notes 193–200 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between pro se
appeals and use of unpublished decisions).
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circuits highlighted above for unusual docket composition—all have a
particularly low volume of pro se appeals.
TABLE 7: PRO SE AT FILING253
Circuit
First Circuit

Five-Year Mean
34.6%

D.C. Circuit
Second Circuit

36.6%
39.5%

Fifth Circuit
Ninth Circuit

45.3%
45.4%

Tenth Circuit
Eighth Circuit

47.3%
52.4%

Third Circuit
Sixth Circuit

52.9%
57.4%

Eleventh Circuit
Seventh Circuit

58.2%
59.1%

Fourth Circuit

60.7%

Mean
Standard Deviation

49.1%
9.1%

Several circuits stand out for particularly large volumes of pro se
filings: the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, in which the volume of pro se
activity exceeds one standard deviation, and the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits,
which are well above the mean of 49.1% (but within one standard deviation).
If pro se litigation has driven the development of the appellate triage system,
then one might expect the Seventh Circuit’s procedures to be on par with the
Fourth Circuit’s procedures. But they are, in fact, opposites: the Seventh
Circuit is routinely a publication and oral-argument leader, and the Fourth
Circuit is not.
One might wonder whether the type of pro se litigation differs across
the circuits, even when the volume remains high. We might expect that
where certain types of pro se litigants—namely, pro se prisoners—are a large
253 Data in this Table derive from table B-9 of Judicial Business averaged over the last five reporting
years. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-9, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
jb_b9_0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJA8-V6LA]; JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2019, at tbl.B-9, https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b9_0930.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSU8-PDVG];
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2018, at tbl.B-9, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b9_
0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4P8-UJCQ]; JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017, at tbl.B-9, https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b9_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSA5-ZZBB];
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2016, at tbl.B-9, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b9_
0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YZG-7P2V].
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percentage of a court’s docket that courts might rely more heavily on secondtier procedures. Not always. Table 8 identifies the percentage of pro se
prisoner appeals as a percentage of all appeals filed in each geographic
circuit. 254 The three circuits with the lowest overall percentage of pro se
litigation—the D.C., First, and Second Circuits—are all more than one
standard deviation below the mean for overall percentage of pro se prisoner
filings. The Fourth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit—the leaders in pro se
filings, more generally—are one standard deviation above the mean.
TABLE 8: 2020 OVERALL DOCKET PERCENTAGE OF PRO SE PRISONER
APPEALS (EXCLUDING ORIGINAL APPLICATIONS)255
Circuit

Five-Year Mean

D.C. Circuit
First Circuit

8.1%
8.6%

Second Circuit
Ninth Circuit

10.9%
18.5%

Fifth Circuit
Tenth Circuit

19.9%
22.0%

Eleventh Circuit
Third Circuit

23.3%
23.4%

Sixth Circuit
Eighth Circuit

23.4%
25.1%

Fourth Circuit
Seventh Circuit

28.2%
29.2%

Mean

20.0%

Standard Deviation

7.2%

All this to say: except for those circuits with a particularly low volume
of pro se litigation (the D.C., First, and Second Circuits), most circuits see a
relatively consistent256—and a relatively high—volume of pro se prisoner
appeals as a percentage of their overall dockets. The volume of pro se
prisoner appeals—just like the volume of pro se litigation more generally—
cannot account for the disparities in the distribution of federal appellate
resources across the circuits. Although the cause of these disparities may be

254 This category combines the volume of appellate activity in two Administrative Office reporting
categories: U.S. Prisoner Petitions and Private Prisoner Petitions, which includes nonfederal or state
petitions.
255 Data in this Table derive from table B-9 of Judicial Business averaged over the last five reporting
years. See sources cited supra note 253.
256 See infra Appendix A.
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unknowable, the fact of the disparities is uncontroverted—and it creates a
risk of disparate impact that I consider next.
3. Race, Class, and the Courts of Appeals
Whatever accounts for the disparities in procedures across the
circuits,257 it is also the case that these variations may be consequential to the
communities the courts serve.258 Recall, again, that nearly half of all appeals
involve individuals proceeding pro se; these are claimants seeking to
vindicate important federal statutory and constitutional rights—and these
procedures themselves developed in response to a perceived “flood” of these
very kinds of claims. This Section argues that institutional design and
substantial circuit variation have engendered processes that impose uneven
burdens on individuals in our most vulnerable communities. As Professor
Dorothy Brown’s recent book on the racial disparate impact of tax law
concluded: “[T]here’s nothing in this country that race . . . [is not] a part
of.”259 So too here. The variations in circuit procedures appear to have a
disparate impact based on race and, to a lesser extent, class.
I make these observations with tentativeness. I do not know the race or
ethnicity of any pro se appellant in any appeal in any court. The courts do
not track these data. What I do know is that a great many litigants in the
federal appellate system are individuals—often proceeding pro se. It follows
that these litigants reflect their community at least in rough proportion;
indeed, recent work from Professors Roger Michalski and Andrew
Hammond suggests that pro se litigants in the district court are more likely
to come from nonhomogeneously white communities.260 Thus, even without
knowing the identity of any particular litigant, we can see some relationship
between the disparities in how the circuits distribute procedures and the
impact the courts may have on the communities they serve, because these
courts serve communities in particular geographic regions about which we
have demographic information.
The bottom line is this: relative circuit “whiteness” and “Blackness”
based on census data for the population in a circuit correlate with differences

257 Professor Levy has suggested that circuit “culture” should be taken into account, an assessment
with which I agree. Levy, Mechanics, supra note 91, at 368.
258 McAlister, supra note 27, at 559.
259 DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IMPOVERISHES
BLACK AMERICANS—AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT 223 (2021).
260 See Roger Michalski & Andrew Hammond, Mapping the Justice Gap in Federal Court, 57 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming May 2022) (manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3931568
[https://perma.cc/GB5Z-CC4J] (indicating that, even after accounting for both population and income,
pro se litigants in the federal trial courts are more likely to reside in communities that are not
homogeneously white).
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in appellate procedures across the country.261 That means that whiter circuits
tend to publish more of their decisions, and Blacker circuits do not. And
wealthier, whiter circuits tend to hold oral argument more often, and poorer,
Blacker ones do not.
Table 9 ranks the circuits from least to most diverse based on circuit
whiteness. 262 Those highlighted in green are more than one standard
deviation above the mean for whiteness (i.e., the least diverse); those
highlighted in red are more than one standard deviation below the mean for
whiteness (i.e., the most diverse). The Ninth and Fifth Circuits are the only
majority-minority circuits.
TABLE 9: CIRCUIT WHITENESS
Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
First Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Third Circuit
Second Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Fifth Circuit

Circuit Whiteness (2019)
79.1%
77.2%
75.7%
70.0%
67.0%
61.5%
58.5%
57.6%
54.3%
46.7%
44.5%

Mean
Standard Deviation

62.9%
11.9%

Now consider circuit Blackness, i.e., those circuits with the largest
percentage of individuals identifying as Black or African-American alone or
in combination with other races according to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2019
population estimates. Table 10 identifies those circuits from most to least
Black. Those marked in red are more than one standard deviation above the
261

Circuit whiteness refers to the percentage of individuals living within a circuit who identify as
“White alone, not Hispanic or Latino,” according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Circuit “Blackness” refers
to the percentage of individuals living within a circuit who identify as “Black or African American alone”
or in combination with one or more other races in the 2019 American Community Survey estimates (table
B02009). See QuickFacts United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/54GP-G9VA]. I combined the relevant state-level data into
circuit-level data. For all Census Bureau information, see Explore Census Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/ [https://perma.cc/FC7G-CPXT]. All data are on file with the author.
262 Note that I omit the D.C. Circuit, which is very diverse but a docket-composition outlier. See
supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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mean (the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits); those marked in green are more
than one standard deviation below the mean (the Ninth and Tenth Circuits).
TABLE 10: CIRCUIT BLACKNESS
Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
First Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit

Circuit Blackness (2019)
24.1%
23.5%
18.1%
16.5%
14.8%
14.8%
12.4%
9.7%
8.0%
6.4%
5.6%

Mean
Standard Deviation

13.9%
6.4%

All this to say: the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits are the most
diverse, and in particular, the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have the greatest
concentration of Black Americans. Recall that these are also the circuits with
the smallest first tier and the largest second tier of federal appellate
procedure, as reflected in the overall volume of unpublished decisions and
use of oral argument.263
It is no surprise, then, that circuit Blackness correlates moderately with
the use of unpublished decisions across the circuits. Those circuits with
higher percentages of Black Americans are generally more likely to use
unpublished decisions; those circuits with lower percentages of Black
Americans are less likely. 264 Figure 3 demonstrates a moderate positive
correlation between the two:

263 See supra notes 232–235 and accompanying text (discussing relative rates of oral argument and
use of unpublished decisions); supra Figure 1; supra Table 5.
264 Some may argue that the disparities we see have resulted from population growth in the sun belt.
See infra Table 17 and accompanying text (identifying patterns of population growth across the circuits).
But these disparities predate modern population trends; indeed, the old Fifth Circuit originated the triage
regime in the 1960s. See generally Haworth, supra note 33 (describing the origins of the screening and
nonargument track).
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Rate of Unpublished Decisions

FIGURE 3: PERCENTAGE OF UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS AGAINST
CIRCUIT BLACKNESS (2019–2020)265
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Consistently with the results for circuit Blackness, circuit whiteness
inversely correlates with the use of unpublished decisions. That means that
the least diverse circuits tend to rely less on unpublished decisions than those
circuits that have greater diversity. As the percentage of white Americans in
a particular circuit increases, the rate of unpublished decisions falls. Figure
4 demonstrates a strong inverse correlation between the two:

265 The Pearson correlation value for the data presented in Figure 3 is 0.47, implying moderate
correlation. See supra note 232.
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FIGURE 4: PERCENTAGE OF UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS AGAINST
CIRCUIT WHITENESS (2019–2020)266
100.0%
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Circuit Blackness also correlates inversely with the use of oral
argument across the circuits, but circuit whiteness has no correlation with the
use of oral argument. Circuit Blackness is a moderate predictor of the volume
of oral argument—driven, no doubt, by the very low rates of oral argument
in the circuits with the largest percentages of Black Americans (the Fourth
and Eleventh Circuits). Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the lack of correlation
between circuit whiteness and oral argument and the moderate inverse
correlation between circuit Blackness and oral argument. That means that
circuits with higher populations of Black Americans are less likely to use
oral argument in their decision-making—and, potentially, that those
communities are less likely to benefit from having their cases heard
(assuming, of course, that Black Americans litigate where they reside and in
numbers proportionate to their representation in the community). Again, this
is a story of potential impact—and not of any intentional discrimination.

266 The Pearson correlation value for the data presented in Figure 4 is 0.61, implying strong
correlation. See supra note 232.
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FIGURE 5: PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH ORAL ARGUMENT
AGAINST CIRCUIT WHITENESS (2019–2020)267
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FIGURE 6: PERCENTAGE OF CASES WITH ORAL ARGUMENT
AGAINST CIRCUIT BLACKNESS (2019–2020)
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267 The Pearson correlation values for the data presented in Figures 5 and 6 are 0.04 and 0.39,
respectively, implying weak and moderate correlation. See supra note 232.
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This is a story of class, too. Circuit wealth appears to have some
relationship to reliance on second-tier procedure, as well. Table 11 identifies
the wealthiest to the poorest circuits per capita. The dividing line in the table
reflects the mean ($35,807).
TABLE 11: CIRCUIT PER CAPITA INCOME (2019)268
Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit

Per Capita Income
$43,202
$42,223
$37,887
$36,190
$36,080

Seventh Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Fifth Circuit

$35,200
$34,078
$33,529
$32,259
$31,983
$31,243

Most notably, the rate of oral argument (a feature of first-tier appellate
process) moderately correlates with circuit per capita income. Figure 7
demonstrates that as circuit per capita income rises, so too does the use of
oral argument to resolve cases.

268 To derive circuit per capita income, I used 2019 per capita income estimates from the U.S. Census
Bureau. I multiplied each state’s per capita income by the state’s population to generate the total income
per state, and I added each state’s total income to generate total income per circuit. I then divided that
circuit-wide income by overall circuit population. See QuickFacts United States, supra note 261.
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FIGURE 7: CIRCUIT PER CAPITA INCOME AGAINST RATE OF ORAL ARGUMENT (2019–2020)269
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Circuit wealth is also suggestive of the use of unpublished decisions,
but the correlation is significantly weaker than we see between wealth and
oral argument. Figure 8 depicts the relationship between circuit wealth and
unpublication rates.
FIGURE 8: CIRCUIT PER CAPITA INCOME AGAINST RATE
OF UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS (2019–2020)
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269 The Pearson correlation values for the data presented in Figures 7 and 8 are 0.39 and 0.18,
respectively, implying moderate and weak correlation. See supra note 232.
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We should be mindful that correlation does not equal causation. But the
fact remains: the most diverse circuits and, in particular, those with the
largest percentages of Black Americans tend to rely on more procedural
shortcuts than peer circuits. Similarly, the wealthiest circuits appear more
likely to extend the procedural safeguard of oral argument.
Let me underscore again that this is not a narrative of disparate
treatment. I do not claim that any single court has developed or deployed its
procedures to discriminate intentionally against any particular group. But
what is clear is that some circuits—the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits, in particular—rely more heavily on second-tier procedures. And
they do so in regions of the country that are more diverse than others. Their
dockets are not notably different; each circuit sees a sufficient volume of pro
se, administrative, and criminal appeals where the litigant on the other side
of government power is an individual. And that individual may, more often
than in other circuits, be a person of color. The disparate impact of the second
tier of federal appellate procedure may be yet another way in which, as
Professors Michalski and Hammond recently observed, “our civil legal
system [has failed] to respond to the legal needs of minority communities.”270
III. HOW TO DISTRIBUTE ARTICLE III RESOURCES
IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
If the two-tiered system of federal appellate justice is one born of
necessity, it is time to reduce its necessity. The number of appeals crested at
nearly 70,000 in 2005 271 and has fallen to—and held steady at—around
48,000 in recent years.272 Although that trend might suggest that the need for
additional judges has receded—or, at least, is no longer at crisis-like levels—
focusing on gross numbers oversimplifies the problem and underappreciates
the distributive justice concerns of court scholars. The courts have limped
along for the better part of the last century only because they have relied
increasingly on shortcuts to handle their enormous workload. 273 Those
shortcuts have cost the most for the system’s least powerful.274 If there’s an
opportunity now to rethink a good distribution of Article III resources, then
Congress should take it. What follows is a starting place for that
conversation.
Lower court reform can have many features, but my focus here is on
the hows, whys, and wheres of Article III resource allocation at the federal
270
271
272
273
274

Michalski & Hammond, supra note 260, at 4.
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2005, at tbl.B-1.
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-1; JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2019, at tbl.B-1.
See supra Section I.A (discussing how the courts of appeals have adapted to increased caseloads).
See supra Section II.B (discussing the disparate impact of reforms across race and class).
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appellate level: how many judges the courts need, why, and where. This Part
first considers the historical objections and roadblocks to adding judges.
Then, it discusses the problems with the existing measures for judicial need.
Finally, it offers three models that Congress could adopt to codify judicial
expansion at the federal appellate level in periodic intervals.
A. Judicial Objections to Adding Judges—and
Why Congress Shouldn’t Listen
Other than a slight readjustment, 275 there have been no new judges
added to the U.S. Courts of Appeals in over thirty years. That’s not for lack
of trying—at least not exactly. Since 1997,276 the Judicial Conference of the
U.S. Courts has made nearly biennial 277 requests to Congress for more
authorized judgeships in at least some of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.278 Only
six of the eleven numbered circuits have made biennial requests over the last
quarter century,279 and one court (the Fifth Circuit) promptly withdrew its
only request the following year.280 One circuit—the Ninth Circuit—has made
a request each time; only one other court (the Sixth Circuit) has asked for

275 Although no judges have been added to the U.S. Courts of Appeals since 1990, one authorized
judgeship was reassigned from the D.C. Circuit to the Ninth Circuit in 2009. Levy, Senior Judges, supra
note 36, at 1236 n.50.
276 This history postdates the last major omnibus judge bill in 1990, which added eleven judges to
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 202, 104 Stat.
5098, 5098–99.
277 For all Judicial Conference reports, see Reports of the Proceedings - Judicial Conference of the
U.S., U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/reports-proceedings-judicial-conferenceus [https://perma.cc/6BQ9-BZMY]; see also infra Table 13 (identifying relevant requests per year).
278 The modern process began in 1993, when the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Long Range
Planning reaffirmed its 1990 “position favoring ‘a relatively small Article III judiciary,’” while also
requesting that it collaborate with other judicial institutions on “an updated, comprehensive method for
evaluating needs for permanent circuit judgeships, including reexamination of caseload formulas and
standards.” Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United
States 51 (Sept. 20, 1993) (quoting Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 93 (Sept. 12, 1990), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
reports_of_the_proceedings_1990-09_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4LY-TMEK]), https://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/1993-09_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAK7-8HSV]. In its March 1997 report, the
Judicial Conference made its first recommendation based on that updated process. See Jud. Conf. of the
U.S., Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 27 (Mar. 11, 1997),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/1997-03_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM8K-8PWH].
279 See infra Table 12 (identifying relevant requests since 1997).
280 See Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United
States 19 (Mar. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Judicial Conference Report 1998], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/1998-03_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4PN-SLU2] (“At the request of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals and on recommendation of the Committee on Judicial Resources, the Judicial Conference agreed
at this session to rescind its recommendation for the additional Fifth Circuit judgeship.”).
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any additional help since 2011, when the Second and Third Circuits dropped
repeated requests for additional judges.281
The Judicial Conference’s process for making judgeship requests
depends on a crucial first step: the circuit court itself must request more
judges. As Judge Brian Miller recently explained in testimony before
Congress: “If the court does not make a request, the Judicial Conference does
not consider recommending a judgeship for that court.” 282 And, just as
important, for any court to make such a request, a majority of its sitting active
judges must agree to ask the Judicial Conference to evaluate circuit need.283
If the majority doesn’t want new judges, the circuit will not get new judges—
unless, that is, Congress overrides the Judicial Conference’s (lack of)
recommendation.
Historically, there have been at least two major stumbling blocks to
adding judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: (1) the courts themselves, to
the extent that the courts are seen to initiate the process, and (2) Congress,
as the ultimate decision-maker on judicial need. The latter is a complicated
gatekeeper284—and the politics of judicial appointments and court expansion
are beyond the scope of my work here. As difficult as those politics are, I
suggest that judicial recalcitrance makes the politics harder. It might be
easier for Congress (at least in some circumstances) to find the political will
for modest expansion in the lower courts when the courts themselves give an
imprimatur to the request. From that perspective, judicial recalcitrance has
an effect; those on either side of the aisle can weaponize deference to judicial
assessments about judicial need to block additions to the federal bench. What
I’ve tried to show in Part II is that judicial recalcitrance and congressional
acquiescence or inertia permits systemic inequities to propagate. Whatever
281 The Sixth Circuit stopped repeated requests in 2013. See, e.g., Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Report of
the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 21 (Mar. 15, 2011), https://www.uscourts.
gov/sites/default/files/2011-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HZP-MMN6] (noting requests from the Second
Circuit for two permanent judgeships, the Third Circuit for one permanent judgeship, and the Sixth Circuit
for one permanent judgeship); see also infra Table 13 (identifying the timeline of relevant requests).
282 The Judicial Conference’s Recommendation for More Judgeships: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3 (2020) (statement of Hon. Miller, J., U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, Chair, Judicial Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics)
[hereinafter Miller Testimony].
283 See BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45899, RECENT RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE FOR NEW U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGESHIPS: OVERVIEW AND
ANALYSIS 10 n.40 (2019) (“U.S. circuit courts are asked to submit requests for additional judgeships only
if a majority of the court’s active judges approve of the request.”).
284 Congress has constitutional control over the existence and structure of the lower federal courts,
including the number of authorized judgeships on each court. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”).
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deference Congress owes to courts, then, is modest—and it should be
sensitive to the entrenched interests that may drive courts not to ask Congress
for more help.
Judicial opposition to significant expansion of the federal appellate
bench has long been strong. The judges themselves have been the best
lobbyists for the status quo—even over the objection of some dissenting
colleagues. Dueling American Bar Association Journal articles from the
early 1990s illustrate the conflict well. In 1992, a sitting Ninth Circuit judge
wrote a letter (reprinted in the Journal) to then-Senator Joseph Biden, the
Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, begging Congress to double the
federal appellate courts: “There are simply far too few of us to do the job
properly,” he told then-Chair Biden.285 In response, a sitting judge on the
Eleventh Circuit, Gerald Tjoflat, weighed in with his own article in the
Journal: More Judges, Less Justice. His West Coast colleague had fallen
“prey to the sirens of size”; the real problem in “most circuits,” he said, “is
not that [the circuits] have too few judges, but that they have too many.”286
That took some chutzpah, given that the Ninth Circuit, whence the judge
advocating for doubling the federal appellate bench hailed, was then and still
is the only “jumbo court” at the heart of the Eleventh Circuit judge’s
critique.287 Surely a judge sitting on the Ninth Circuit might have a better
perspective about what that court, in particular, needs.
The debate between these judges reflects a core debate over how we
view the work of courts: either as elite institutions rightly selective in how
they distribute their resources, or as fundamentally egalitarian institutions
that should be committed to providing public services to every litigant. The
Eleventh Circuit judge’s view is typical of the former; the Ninth Circuit
judge’s view is typical of the latter. Ultimately, those advocating for the
federal appellate bench to remain small, elite, and static have prevailed
before Congress, whether because of political infeasibility, inertia,
disinterest, or deference to the courts themselves.
285 See Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, 79 A.B.A. J. 52, 52 (1993). The late
Judge Reinhardt has been credibly accused of sexually harassing his then-law clerk. See Protecting
Federal Judiciary Employees from Sexual Harassment, Discrimination, and Other Workplace
Misconduct: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., & the Internet, 116th Cong. 1 (2020)
(statement of Olivia Warren). For this reason, I have not referred to him by name above the line.
286 Tjoflat, supra note 43, at 70.
287 Id. Judge Tjoflat had previously served on the old Fifth Circuit which, at twenty-six judges, had
been the largest court before it was split in 1980. At the time of the article, however, the Ninth Circuit
had twenty-eight judges and the Fifth Circuit, the second largest court, had seventeen. See Chronological
History of Authorized Judgeships in U.S. Courts of Appeals, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/appealschronol.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVA3-EGFZ]; see also Timothy J. Corrigan, The
“Duke” of Federal Court: Celebrating Gerald B. Tjoflat’s 50 Years as a Federal Judge, 104 JUDICATURE
6, 6 (2020).
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Those judges concerned with expanding the judiciary would likely
reject my suggestion that elitism has anything to do with their reluctance.
Instead, they would argue that expansion threatens the “quality” of the
federal judiciary, because the increase might reduce the attention paid to the
appointments process (and open the pool to less qualified contenders). 288
Relatedly, some have expressed concern that adding to the bench will reduce
the prestige of the position, making it less desirable for the most qualified
potential appointees (a significant worry given the relative low pay for the
position). 289 Other objections have focused less on the judges themselves
than on the potential cost to the federal government and to the stability of
circuit law that may follow from larger courts.290
Professors Richman and Reynolds persuasively argued more than a
decade ago that most of these objections elevate the interests of the judge
over the needs of justice. 291 To be sure, the quality of judges—and their
satisfaction with their job—matters and may ultimately affect the quality of
justice those judges provide. But it’s difficult to see how a modest increase
in judges of the sort I call for in Section III.C would lead to an erosion of
judicial quality. Would taking a court from twelve judges to fifteen judges,
for example, so dilute the prestige of the position as to make a lifetime
appointment to the federal bench undesirable to qualified applicants? Will
that loss of prestige (being one of fifteen instead of one of twelve) really
affect the process—more so than, say, how grueling, contentious, and
invasive judicial nominations and confirmations have become?
Ultimately, the appellate judiciary’s decades-long reluctance to make
consistent and sustained requests for more Article III resources should not
give Congress pause. There’s a limit to the deference Congress owes the
federal appellate bench when making decisions that would shape the
contours of judges’ power and influence. The procedures that are now firmly
entrenched in the appellate courts have done much to insulate the bench from
caseload pressures. Busy courts have outsourced their work to central staff
attorneys, and that radically reshapes the daily work of appellate judges. To
288

Tjoflat, supra note 43, at 70.
See Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century of Judicial Reform: Time as the
Greatest Innovator, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 260–61 (1988).
290 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 179–84 (discussing common objections to
substantial increases in the size of the federal appellate bench).
291 See id. at 177 (“All of the foregoing quality-of-the-bench arguments suffer from an additional and
very serious flaw. They all focus on the quality of the active circuit judges—not on the total average
quality of the appellate justice dispensed.”). I would put concerns over diminished “collegiality” on big
courts in this bucket, too. See, e.g., id. at 204–06 (discussing collegiality concerns with adding too many
judges to the courts). Diminished collegiality is surely a real concern, but it’s a nebulous one. It’s one
thing to add one or two judges over time, and it’s another thing to add ten at once. My proposals, thus,
focus on incremental additions.
289
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the extent that more resources might change expectations (including hearing
more oral argument or writing more published decisions), that only would
add work to the judiciary’s plate or realign individual panel priorities. In a
circuit where any one judge has the power to send a case to oral argument,
the addition of a new judge with a different set of values, expectations, and
normative priorities might have a radical effect. That is to say nothing of the
potential for partisan preferences to play some role in how a judge perceives
circuit need (and which president and which Senate fills it).
Outsiders to the courts, on the other hand, largely agree that the
appellate courts need more Article III resources. There’s agreement among
scholars of all stripes that the federal courts of appeals need more judges,
and they need more judges in no small part because their work—and the
quality of justice—has suffered.292 Professor Steven Calabresi and Shams
Hirji cited the “significant[] deteriorat[ion]” of the work of the U.S. Courts
of Appeals as a reason to support lower court packing.293 Although Calabresi
and Hirji’s plan was criticized as partisan,294 it shouldn’t be the case that
every addition to the courts need be seen through a partisan lens. Nor, for
that matter, should the partisan implications of additional authorized
judgeships be a reason to put needed (and even overdue) reforms on ice. The
next Sections offer a modest, need-based framework for deciding when and
where to add federal appellate judges that hopes to lessen its partisan
implications.

292 See, e.g., id. at 115; Litman, supra note 2 (“Any court reform—indeed, any democracy reform—
requires more lower federal courts.”); see also Menell & Vacca, supra note 58, at 879 (“Unless Congress
can overcome the impediments to judiciary reform, the American justice system will continue to
experience the erosion of its capacity to fulfill its essential role.”). But see Ronald A. Cass, Adding Judges:
Issues in Federal Courts’ Governance 17 (C. Boyden Gray Ctr. for the Study of the Admin. State,
Working Paper No. 21-25, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3836045 [https://perma.cc/3EXZ-V462]
(opposing the addition of judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals as based on “[t]he most glaringly flawed
arguments”). Cass generally would have Congress add judges to the appellate courts only when they
struggle to clear their dockets year over year. Id. at 29. He does not engage meaningfully with the kinds
of distributive justice concerns I raise here to support judgeship additions.
293 Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji, Proposed Judgeship Bill 10 (Nw. Univ. Pritzker Sch. of L.,
Working Paper No. 17-24, 2017), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/uploads/2017/11/calabresi-courtpacking-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP9C-4BJV].
294 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Opinion, The Case Against Court-Packing, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/11/
27/the-case-against-court-packing/ [https://perma.cc/S4K7-HZKR] (“[I]t is not unfair to conclude that
court-packing is a major objective of their proposal, even if it is not the only one.”); see also Richard
Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional Analysis of the Calabresi-Hirji
Judgeship Proposal, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2017), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooksplaygrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal/ [https://
perma.cc/V7U6-NDUT] (“The express motive for the proposal is to change the ideological and/or
partisan composition of the judiciary.”).
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B. How Courts and Congress Currently Think About
Judicial Need—and What’s Wrong with It
Adding judges is tricky business. Even if we can jettison partisan
concerns, one challenge is that the existing framework for assessing judicial
need is deeply flawed. More than a decade ago, the United States
Government Accountability Office observed that “there is no empirical
basis” on which the Judicial Conference bases its recommendations for
adding circuit court judgeships. 295 And despite considering “a number of
alternatives,” the Judicial Conference has never agreed on another
approach.296
Under that problematic process, the Judicial Conference measures
circuit busyness based on “a standard of 500 adjusted filings per panel.”297
That means that it assumes that each appellate court can handle about 500
“adjusted filings”—I’ll come back to that in a minute—per panel per year.
It’s the Judicial Conference’s policy that where a court does not exceed 500
adjusted filings per panel, it will not consider a circuit for an additional
judgeship.298 To calculate adjusted filings, the Judicial Conference starts with
overall annual filings, “remov[es] reopened appeals[,] and count[s] original
pro se appeals as one-third of a case.”299 Then, that new number is divided
by the number of three-judge panels each court can compose.
So, for example, if a circuit has 1,000 filings per year, 50 reopened
appeals, and 300 pro se filings, it would have 750 adjusted filings per year
(1,000 – 350 + (300 / 3)). Then, if the court happened to have six authorized
judgeships, it could constitute two panels of three, so the 750 adjusted filings
would be divided by two to arrive at 375 adjusted filings per panel—a
number that would make our hypothetical circuit ineligible for a Judicial
Conference recommendation for additional judgeships.
Although this process “represents an effort to improve” earlier need
assessments, which were based on nothing more than “the restraint of
individual courts of appeals,” it suffers from a fatal flaw: “It is not based on
empirical data regarding the judge time that different types of cases may

295 Federal Judgeships: The General Accuracy of District and Appellate Judgeship Case-Related
Workload Measures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight & the Cts. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7–9 (2009) (statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security
& Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office) [hereinafter GAO Testimony].
296 Id. at 4.
297 Miller Testimony, supra note 282, at 6.
298 See GAO Testimony, supra note 295, at 7.
299 Miller Testimony, supra note 282, at 6. “Reopened appeals” account for a relatively slight volume
of appellate activity. In 2020, for example, there were 1,350 reopened appeals out of 48,190 commenced
(less than 3%). JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-1.
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require.”300 And, conveniently, the 500 per-panel adjusted-filings benchmark
just happens to coincide with what the courts of appeals were generally
handling at the time the benchmark was developed (around 2003 and
2004). 301 All this led the Government Accountability Office to issue the
damning conclusion that the Judicial Conference had provided “no empirical
basis” for its assessments.302
Making matters worse, the Judicial Conference neither publishes these
adjusted-filings numbers nor makes public any part of its deliberative
process. The numbers, at least, are easy enough to piece together, which I
have done in Table 12 below. For this table, I removed reopened appeals and
adjusted the number of filings based on each circuit’s pro se filings.303 I then
divided that number by the number of panels available among the circuit’s
authorized judgeships. Circuits exceeding 500 adjusted filings are in yellow
(slight excess), orange (more considerable excess), and red (more than one
standard deviation (176.6) above the mean (519)).
TABLE 12: GENERAL ADJUSTED WORKLOAD PER PANEL BY CIRCUIT304
2019 Appeals
Commenced
(Original)
900
1,338
4,080
3,454
4,474
6,666
4,184
2,575
2,794
9,747
1,731
5,061

Circuit
D.C. Cir.
1st Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.
4th Cir.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.

300

Current
Authorized
Judges
11
6
13
14
15
17
16
11
11
29
12
12

Existing
Panels

Pro Se

Adjusted
Filings

3.67
2.00
4.33
4.67
5.00
5.67
5.33
3.67
3.67
9.67
4.00
4.00

335
435
1,788
1,624
2,655
3,196
2,446
1,516
1,467
4,490
782
2,994

666
1,034
2,828
2,317
2,616
4,429
2,472
1,514
1,767
6,604
1,184
2,965

Existing perPanel Adjusted
Filings
182
517
653
497
523
782
463
413
482
683
296
741

GAO Testimony, supra note 295, at 8–9.
Id. at 8.
302 Id. at 9.
303 I should note that neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Federal Circuit is part of the Judicial Conference
process for evaluating judgeship needs, but I have included the D.C. Circuit here for the sake of
comparison. See Judicial Conference Report 1998, supra note 280, at 19 (observing that D.C. and Federal
Circuits are “excluded from the process and standards used by the Conference for determining judgeship
needs”).
304 Data derive from JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2019, at tbls.B-1, B-9.
301
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Recall that in recent years only the Ninth Circuit has asked Congress to
add judges to its ranks through the Judicial Conference process. The Ninth
Circuit, indeed, exceeds the 500 adjusted-filing benchmark, but it’s not the
busiest court. That honor falls to the Fifth Circuit, followed by the Eleventh
Circuit.
Here, I should note another outlier: the Tenth Circuit. Its volume of
appellate activity is so low that the Judicial Conference has advocated
for leaving an authorized judgeship on the Tenth Circuit vacant 305 (a
recommendation that neither President Trump nor Congress followed when
Judge Allison Eid filled the open seat following the elevation of Justice Neil
Gorsuch306).
Since 1997, when this wayward process began, requests for additional
judgeships in the covered circuits have dwindled. That’s not terribly
surprising, given that appellate activity has fallen since 2005 and stabilized
in recent years. 307 What is surprising, however, is that some circuits—in
particular, those very busy courts that rely the most on second-tier
procedures—have almost never requested additional help from Congress. As
Table 13 demonstrates, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have not
asked for more judges (save for a withdrawn request from the Fifth Circuit).

305 Since 2017, the Judicial Conference has “recommend[ed] to the President and the Senate [that
they] not fill[] the next judgeship vacancy in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.” Jud. Conf. of
the U.S., Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 17 (Mar. 14, 2017),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017-03_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/24QE-4VYG]. Beginning
in 1996, the Judicial Conference began recommending not only adding authorized judgeships, but also
leaving them vacant or reducing them. Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 22 (Mar. 16, 1999), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/199903_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LGD-Y48V].
306 Mark K. Matthews, President Trump Nominates Allison Eid to Fill Neil Gorsuch’s Seat on 10th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, DENVER POST (June 7, 2017, 11:47 AM), https://www.denverpost.
com/2017/06/07/donald-trump-allison-eid-nomination-10th-circuit-court-of-appeals/ [https://perma.cc/
5YDX-Z39H].
307 See supra notes 271–272.
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TABLE 13: JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REQUESTS TO CONGRESS FOR
AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS BY CIRCUIT AND YEAR308
Circuit
1st Cir.
2d Cir.

1997
1P
2P

1999
1P
2P

2002
1T
2P

2005
1P
2P

3d Cir.

2007
1P
2P
2P

4th Cir.
5th Cir.

1P*
2P,
2T

6th Cir.

2P,
1T

6P,
3T

2P,
3T

2011

2013

2015

2017

2019

2021

5P

5P

5P

2T

2P
1P

2P

1P

1P

1P

1P

1P

2P,
3T

1T
5P,
2T

2P
5P,
2T

1T
4P,
1T

4P,
1T

4P,
1T

7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.

2009
1P
2P
1P,
1T

10th Cir.
–1
–1
–1
11th Cir.
Note. * denotes that the Fifth Circuit’s request was withdrawn the following year, P denotes a request for a
permanent judgeship, T denotes a request for a temporary judgeship, and –1 denotes a request that Congress
not fill a vacancy.

Given the unreliability of the Judicial Conference’s efforts to quantify
judicial busyness, it may be helpful to look instead at cases per judge—not
adjusted filings or panel filings. Although I agree that not all appeals will
involve the same amount of work, we don’t have any real way to measure
the relative time investment that any potential appeal may take—including
pro se appeals.309 There’s also a separate normative question about whether
we should devalue from the outset the time investment we expect Article III
judges to make on those appeals. If we instead treat every appeal the same
and divide annual case filings by authorized judgeships, we see a slightly
308

This Table captures the biennial requests from the Judicial Conference available in the Judicial
Conference’s Report of Proceedings. See Reports of the Proceedings—Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
supra note 277. Generally, the requests are made in odd years and included in its March report. A
“[t]emporary judgeship[] [is] created by statutory language stipulating that the first vacancy occurring in
a judicial district after a specified period of time shall not be filled.” MCMILLION, supra note 283, at 5
n.24. The handful of temporary judgeships in U.S. Courts of Appeals history have all been converted to
permanent judgeships. See U.S. Courts of Appeals Authorized Temporary Judgeships, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/appealstemp.pdf [https://perma.cc/26VZ-RBM5].
309 Indeed, it’s quite possible that in some circuits pro se appeals take more judicial time than a
counseled appeal that involves a less complex legal issue (or that may possibly settle on appeal). See
Resnik, supra note 205, at 950 (describing the burden that pro se habeas filings may impose on judges
and law clerks). Regardless, a blanket discount of pro se appeals is, at the very least, empirically
unsupported, as the Government Accountability Office has observed. See GAO Testimony, supra note
295, at 4.
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different picture: how many appeals filed per judge in each circuit per year.310
We might then set as a baseline either the average across all circuits or the
average in a circuit that relies less on the second-tier process (such as the
Seventh Circuit or the Tenth Circuit, for example).
Table 14 considers per-judge filings across the circuits. It highlights in
yellow the courts where filings per judge are one standard deviation (101) or
more above the mean (273) and highlights in green those courts in which
filings are more than one standard deviation below the mean. Based on these
numbers alone, demands per judge are greatest in the Eleventh and Fifth
Circuits, followed by (to a lesser extent) the Ninth and Second Circuits;
needs are least in the D.C. and Tenth Circuits.
TABLE 14: PER-JUDGE FILINGS BY CIRCUIT (2020)311
Circuit
D.C. Cir.
1st Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.
4th Cir.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.

Appeals Filed
1,118
1,284
4,698
2,877
4,680
6,401
4,306
2,609
2,766
10,400
1,737
5,314

Authorized Judges
11
6
13
14
15
17
16
11
11
29
12
12

Appeals Filed Per Judge
102
214
361
206
312
377
269
237
251
359
145
443

In 1990, when Congress last added authorized judgeships to the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, filings per judgeship were at 237 (after the additional
judges were added).312 Today, total filings per authorized judgeship in the
310 Gross filings per judge is not a perfect measure either because some circuits rely heavily on senior
judges (and visiting judges) to help with workload, but that labor is essentially “free” and could vanish
(or be reduced) at any point. That said, in some circuits senior judges provide significant labor to help
busy courts; they average between 40% and 50% of full caseloads. See Levy, Senior Judges, supra note
36, at 1232 (discussing the vital service of senior judges).
311 See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B. Note, these are original numbers that do not exclude
“reopened” cases. Because a “reopened” case captures work that the court must now do—that is, it reflects
cases where a default has been lifted—it seems these appeals should count towards the workload before
a judge, even if they are not “new” work. That does mean that they are potentially counted twice—once
at filing, and once at “reopening”—but they reflect actual work before the court only upon being
reopened. Regardless, it’s a small number of cases per year.
312 COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. CTS. OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 14 (1998); Levy
Testimony, supra note 163, at 5.
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geographic courts of appeals stand at 289 (48,190 annual filings across 167
authorized judgeships).313 That is a nearly 22% increase in filings per judge
per year from the last time Congress addressed judgeship needs at the federal
appellate level.
One approach to judicial expansion might be to take the 1990 measure
as the baseline: that means we treat around 237 appeals per judge as a
reasonable expectation of judicial labor on an annual basis.314 That would
have a judge decide a little less than an appeal per workday each year
(assuming 261 workdays per year and a two-week vacation). Concededly,
that’s an arbitrary guess at a reasonable workload. At other points in time,
scholars have suggested that only 80 appeals per judge per year was an outer
limit;315 when that limit was exceeded, others suggested around 130 appeals
might be the maximum.316 Of course, those estimates dated back to the days
before technology revolutionized legal research and word processing made
drafting more efficient.
Today, courts are far more efficient in many respects—thanks not just
to technology, but also to the amount of nonjudicial help they have. Case
dispositions on the merits per judge across the circuits far exceed 1960s and
1970s expectations. Table 15 looks at judicial output across a variety of
metrics. It identifies the number of judge-issued terminations per authorized
judgeship during the 2020 reporting year (including procedural terminations
issued by judges). It also identifies the number of published opinions per
authorized judgeship and the number of oral arguments per panel (since
judges hear appeals in panels). Today, the courts average close to 200 judgeissued terminations per year across the circuits—not wildly out of proportion
to expectations from the baseline set in 1990.

313 Note that I exclude the Federal Circuit from this calculation, and I use data from JUDICIAL
BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B.
314 Professor Levy’s recent testimony before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary suggests this approach. Levy Testimony, supra note 163, at 6 (observing that courts have seen
an “increase of approximately 20%” in caseload since 1990).
315 See Charles Alan Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration,
42 TEX. L. REV. 949, 957 (1964) (“Eighty dispositions per judge is visionary for some judges, and far
above what most courts regularly achieve.”).
316 See Haworth, supra note 33, at 259 (questioning whether judges “can carefully consider and
dispose of” 128 appeals per year).
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TABLE 15: TERMINATIONS, PUBLISHED OPINIONS, AND
ORAL ARGUMENTS PER JUDGE AND PANEL317

D.C. Cir.
1st Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.
4th Cir.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.

Total
Terminations by
Judges per Judge
50
149
249
161
201
248
211
140
229
261
114
310

Merits
Terminations
per Judge
42
148
189
143
185
218
188
124
207
230
103
270

Published
Opinions
per Judge
17
42
22
14
13
30
23
42
45
15
19
23

Published
Opinions
per Panel
51
126
66
43
38
89
70
126
136
46
57
69

Oral
Arguments
per Panel
58
105
200
49
45
150
76
138
101
131
79
90

Oral
Arguments
per Judge
19
35
67
16
15
50
25
46
34
44
26
30

Mean

194

170

25

76

102

34

Circuit

This Table also underscores exactly why some courts have not asked
for additional resources despite having heavy caseloads. The triage system
permits judges to focus on cases that are argued orally and that end in
published opinions. A judge might be responsible for writing opinions in
only 34 cases per year after argument, which may result, on average, in
writing only 25 fully reasoned, published decisions (because some appeals
from argument will not be published). (Of course, judges will have to prepare
for oral argument in more cases.) Again, Article III attention goes to a select
few in the federal appellate system, and the demands of the first tier—as
reasonable as they are—drive the courts’ self-perception of judicial needs.
Staff attorneys help courts absorb all that extra work—that is, those
cases that don’t receive first-tier treatment. Indeed, judges might well agree
that their maximum today is only about, say, 130 (first-tier) appeals per
year—that is, that they cannot give sustained attention to more than that
number of appeals. The current distribution of resources permits judges to
do a lot more—at least on paper—while insulating them from feeling any
particular need for more Article III help.
Circuits with more staff-attorney help do a lot more work with fewer
Article III resources. Based on data that Judge Posner compiled in 2017,318

317
318

See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbls.B-1, B-9, B-12.
POSNER, supra note 10, at 162–63.
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Table 16 identifies the number of full-time-equivalent staff attorneys across
the geographic circuits and compares those numbers to the number of
authorized judgeships in each circuit. Only one circuit’s ratio of staff
attorneys to authorized judgeships exceeds two standard deviations above
the mean: the Eleventh Circuit, which is also the court with the highest
number of terminations per judge per year.319
TABLE 16: CIRCUIT USE OF STAFF ATTORNEYS
Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit

Staff Attorneys
19.5
35.5
26.5
45
42
32
18.5
18.5
77.5
20
65

Ratio to Authorized Judgeships
3.3
2.7
1.9
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.7
1.7
2.7
1.7
5.4

Mean
Standard Deviation

36.4
19.8

2.6
1.1

By almost any measure—adjusted filings per panel, filings per judge,
terminations per judge, and reliance on non-judicial staff—a court like the
Eleventh Circuit needs more Article III resources. 320 Yet it has chosen,
instead, to invest in nonjudicial staff, and it has continued to distribute
Article III resources sparingly.321 Any reasonable assessment of judicial need
should ensure that a circuit like the Eleventh Circuit does not escape scrutiny
simply because a majority of its judges have not asked Congress for more
help.
Finally, none of these data take into account the work of senior or
visiting judges. Across the circuits today, senior and visiting judges
participate in approximately 25% of merits terminations annually 322 —a

319

Supra Table 15.
See supra Table 12 (741 adjusted filings per panel); Table 14 (443 filings per judge); Table 15
(310 terminations per judge); Table 16 (5.4 ratio of staff attorneys to judges).
321 For example, the Eleventh Circuit is well below average in publication and oral argument. See
supra Table 5 (oral-argument rate of 10.24% and unpublication rate of 93.26%).
322 JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-11, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/
jb_b11_0930.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8MR-6X53].
320
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significant volume of work that greatly reduces the burden on the active
federal appellate judges. The help that senior and visiting judges provide
varies widely across the circuits—ranging from a high of 41% of cases in the
Ninth Circuit to a low of around 12% in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits.323
This labor is essentially volunteer help, and it could vanish or be reduced
without warning. To be sure, senior and visiting judges are essential to the
efficient operation of the federal appellate courts, but how to assess and
measure their help, and how to account for it on a going-forward basis, is
especially difficult. 324 Were the supply of senior judges, in particular, to
become much lower in some circuits, undoubtedly those courts would see an
immediate need for more Article III judicial resources—the question this
Article turns to next.
C. How to Add Judges to the Courts of Appeals
I propose three different models for thinking about how to add judges
to the federal appellate courts. These are starting places. They are high-level
roadmaps for legislation that could trigger congressional inquiry into
judgeship needs automatically and at fixed intervals. That structure might
lessen the partisan implications of authorizing additional judgeships; were
expansion procedures codified and standardized, they would become
predictable and routine. These models are also starting places in another
sense: I focus on only one-half of the equation. These models describe what
would trigger a congressional inquiry into the need for additional judgeships
on a particular court. No matter which model (or models—these could be
enacted in combination) Congress might choose, I also envision the courts
providing significant feedback during the process.
1. The Average-Circuit Model
The first possibility is the average-circuit model. It identifies circuit
norms for the distribution of Article III resources and then seeks to bring all
other circuits in line with the existing average distribution of resources. It
would make modest, but routine, adjustments in authorized judgeships
whenever a court falls out of step with its peers over a five-year period. This
model has both a mandatory and an optional (or court-initiated) trigger.

323

Id.
Accounting for and adjusting for the impact of senior judges, in particular, is beyond the scope
of this Article. It is possible that the work of senior judges mitigates some of the concerns I raise here
about overreliance on nonjudicial decision-makers.
324
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Every five years, Congress would initiate a mandatory review for at
least one new authorized judgeship in any geographic circuit in which,325
based on five-year means, any one of the following conditions is met:
•
•
•
•
•
•

A circuit’s unpublication rate is one standard deviation higher
than the national geographic-circuit mean;
A circuit’s rate of oral argument is one standard deviation lower
than the national geographic-circuit mean;
A circuit’s ratio of staff attorneys to authorized judgeships is
one standard deviation higher than the national geographiccircuit mean;
A circuit’s ratio of total filings per judge is one standard
deviation higher than the national geographic-circuit mean;
A circuit’s number of judge-issued terminations per judge is
one standard deviation higher than the national geographiccircuit mean; or
A circuit’s reversal rate of district court decisions is one
standard deviation lower than the national geographic-circuit
mean.

Whenever one of these mandatory “triggering” events occurs, the circuit
would undergo review for at least one new authorized judgeship. Where
more than one of these factors is present, that would create a strong
presumption in favor of at least one additional judgeship that the circuit could
only overcome with a compelling reason (e.g., an unusual spike in caseload
or a stable and consistent bench of senior judges). A court could request more
than one additional judgeship, but given the periodic (five-year) review
period, that may not be necessary.
Under the optional-review alternative, any court that exceeds (or falls
below, depending on the metric) the national mean in any two categories
could request an additional judgeship based on a vote of a majority of the
judges on the court (subject to the transparency procedures outlined below).
Congress would then evaluate that request along with its mandatory-review
process. Congress should ordinarily grant such court-initiated requests.
Importantly, the first five of these factors are within each court’s
control. Courts that desire to keep their benches smaller could work to ensure
that their decisional practices do not fall significantly out of step with peer
courts. Even where the mandatory-review procedures apply, a court could
325 Because of their unusual docket compositions, I would exclude both the Federal Circuit and the
D.C. Circuit from this process and these statistics—just as the Judicial Conference currently does. See
supra note 303 (discussing the exclusion of the Federal and D.C. Circuits from the Judicial Conference
process).
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oppose additional judgeships through the court- and public-review process
described below.
If the average-circuit model were in place today, Congress would be
required to conduct a review of judgeship needs in the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits. A majority of judges in the Second, Third, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits could initiate a request for additional judges, thereby
triggering the same congressional inquiry process. Table 17 demonstrates
how this model operates with current data.
TABLE 17: APPLICATION OF THE AVERAGE-CIRCUIT MODEL TO CURRENT METRICS326
Unpublication
Rate
1st Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.
4th Cir.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.

66.7%
90.0%
90.7%
93.7%
91.3%
90.0%
65.9%
77.0%
93.0%
81.3%
93.3%

OralArgument
Rate
25.2%
33.4%
11.6%
9.2%
19.4%
13.8%
37.2%
16.7%
21.4%
26.2%
10.2%

Staff
Attorney
Ratio
3.3
2.7
1.9
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.7
1.7
2.3
1.7
5.4

Total
Filings per
Judge
227.9
330.1
223.8
322.8
415.2
279.9
255.2
272.0
358.1
157.0
491.9

Judge-Issued
Terminations
per Judge
160.7
215.8
164.5
245.0
282.6
221.0
167.1
230.7
271.3
120.9
356.7

Reversal
Rate
9.0%
8.5%
8.2%
6.6%
5.9%
9.0%
12.6%
4.9%
10.0%
6.9%
7.4%

Mean
84.8%
20.4%
2.6
303.1
221.5
8.1%
Standard
10.5%
9.3%
1.1
94.6
67.2
2.1%
Deviation
Triggering
95.3%
11.1%
3.7
397.7
288.7
6.0%
Amount
Note. Circuits in red would presumptively need at least one additional judge; circuits in orange would
be entitled to one judge and would have triggered the automatic-review process; circuits in green would
be able to request an additional judge if the circuit majority agreed.

326 Total filings per judge in Table 17 differ from Table 14, supra, because Table 17 reflects fiveyear averages, whereas Table 14 uses 2020 data only. Data from this table are annualized over a five-year
period, and they appear in Judicial Business tables. See supra note 248 (tables B-1); supra note 229
(tables B-12), JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2020, at tbl.B-5; JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2019, at tbl.B-5, https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b5_0930.2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH4T-CTAE];
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2018, at tbl.B-5, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b5_
0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BDF-6LXB]; JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017, at tbl.B-5, https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b5_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/73RZ-DNYF];
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2016, at tbl.B-5, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b5_
0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/C59Z-LJEU].
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2. The Population Model
The second model is the population model, which would entitle any
circuit to additional authorized judgeships whenever, based on census data,
(1) either its population-to-authorized-judgeship ratio exceeds the national
geographic-circuit average or the circuit has experienced population growth
that exceeds the national geographic-circuit average, and (2) the circuit is
also above average in filings per judge (based on a five-year mean). Under
this model, Congress would take into account population growth in a
particular region, including how population shifts over time might indicate
future judicial need. Congress would add a sufficient number of authorized
judgeships to bring the circuit within approximately 10% of the national
geographic-circuit mean for filings or terminations per judge (whichever is
highest: currently, 333 for filings or 244 for terminations). One advantage of
this model is that it has an easier mechanism for identifying how many
judges a court may need. Thus, it may be a good resource to use in
combination with the average-circuit model. A circuit would remain free to
lobby for an adjustment (up or down).
Using 2020 census data for circuit population, Table 18 identifies which
circuits would be eligible to receive additional authorized judgeships now
and in what numbers under the population model:
TABLE 18: APPLICATION OF THE POPULATION MODEL327

1st Cir.
2d Cir.

Total
Population
(2020)
10,867,184
24,450,270

Percent
Growth (from
2010 Census)
6.1%
3.7%

Authorized
Judges per
Person (1:value)
1,811,197.33
1,880,790.00

Total
Filings per
Judge
227.9
330.1

Judge-Issued
Terminations
per Judge
160.7
215.8

Circuit

Judges
to Add
0
0

3d Cir.

26,567,516

1.7%

1,897,679.71

223.8

164.5

0

4th Cir.
5th Cir.
6th Cir.

32,160,146
36,764,541
33,293,455

8.0%
12.6%
3.7%

2,144,009.73
2,162,620.06
2,080,840.94

322.8
415.2
279.9

245.0
282.6
221.0

1
3
0

7th Cir.

25,491,754

2.0%

2,317,432.18

255.2

167.1

0

8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.

21,690,565
66,848,869
18,636,936
37,274,374

5.5%
8.6%
9.5%
12.0%

1,971,869.55
2,305,133.41
1,553,078.00
3,106,197.83

272.0
358.1
157.0
491.9

230.7
271.3
120.9
356.7

0
2
0
5

6.7%

2,170,268.68

303.1

221.5

Mean

327 Population figures derive from 2020 census data, which are available at 2020 Population and
Housing State Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/interactive/
2020-population-and-housing-state-data.html [https://perma.cc/9VLS-HBMP].
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Note that because this model balances both population metrics with current
demands on judge time, it would not entitle circuits like the Seventh Circuit
or the Tenth Circuit—which meet the population threshold—to any new
judgeships (because they do not currently experience more demand than
average).
3. The Gross-Filings-Benchmark Model
The third model is the gross-filings-benchmark model, which would
entitle any circuit to additional judges whenever it substantially exceeds the
filings-to-judge ratio set when Congress last authorized additional
judgeships to any federal appellate court. At present, that model would use
the 1990 ratio—the number of filings per judge after the addition of
authorized judges in 1990—as an acceptable benchmark. Accordingly, any
circuit that exceeds 237 filings per judge would be eligible for additional
judgeships. The court would be eligible for whatever number of judges
would bring the court to within approximately 20% of the previous
benchmark (so, around 284 filings per judge). 328 The court would not be
eligible, however, if, with the addition of a new judgeship, the court’s new
per-judge filings rate would fall below the previous benchmark. That carveout ensures that a court that only slightly exceeds the previous benchmark
does not receive a new judge. Table 19 identifies where judges might be
added under this model based on the 1990 benchmark.

328 Because the last benchmark was set in 1990—before technology made at least some of the courts’
work more efficient—I suggest a higher benchmark than for the population model, where I would bring
the courts within 10% of peer circuits in either filings or terminations per judge (whichever is higher).
Once a new benchmark is set, it may be that a 10% range would be more appropriate.
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TABLE 19: APPLICATION OF THE GROSS-FILINGS-BENCHMARK MODEL

1st Cir.
2d Cir.
3d Cir.

Current Authorized
Judgeships
6
13
14

Total Filings
per Judge
227.9
330.1
223.8

Judges to
Add
0
2
0

New Total Filings
per Judge
N/A
286.0
N/A

4th Cir.

15

322.8

2

285.0

5th Cir.
6th Cir.
7th Cir.
8th Cir.
9th Cir.
10th Cir.
11th Cir.

17
16
11
11
29
12
12

415.2
279.9
255.2
272.0
358.1
157.0
491.9

8
1
0*
1
7
0
9

282.0
263.0
N/A
249.0
288.0
N/A
281.0

Circuit

Total
30
Note. Even though the Seventh Circuit exceeds the 237-per-judge filing benchmark, because
the addition of a new authorized judgeship would reduce per-judge filings below the
benchmark, the Seventh Circuit would not receive a judge.

The gross-filings benchmark appears to be the most aggressive of these
various approaches. That’s partly because it plays catch-up for lost time
(meaning, the thirty years of stagnant benches). The other two models
anticipate regular recalibration over time (every five or ten years, depending
on the model), thus resulting in continual, but exceedingly modest,
adjustments to the bench. Regardless, the gross-filings benchmark is
consistent with the pace of growth that the courts of appeals have seen in the
past, and it would reflect an overall expansion of 18.6%, which is
commensurate with the percentage growth in filings since 1990. Appendix
B identifies the pace of judgeship growth in the courts of appeals over time.
The last large omnibus judge bill in 1984329 grew the federal bench by 18.2%,
and the largest ever (in 1978)330 grew the bench by 36.1%.
*

*

*

Under any of these models, whenever a court is eligible for additional
judgeships, that eligibility would trigger an internal court process for each
329 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 201(a),
98 Stat. 333, 346.
330 Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 1629, 1632. Overall judgeship additions
appear in infra Appendix B, and percentage increases have been calculated using the growth rate year
over year.
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court to develop a recommendation on judgeship needs to Congress. That
process should engage those with dissenting views and the public, ensuring
that Congress hears from anyone with an interest in judicial need.331 If a
majority of the court agrees that additional judges are needed, the court
should provide a recommendation to Congress to that effect (including how
many judges and in what duty stations or states). If a majority of a court
disagrees, however, it should provide Congress with a detailed, specific
explanation as to why additional Article III resources are not needed. No
matter the ultimate recommendation, any judge who disagrees with the
majority’s recommendation should have an opportunity to submit a minority
report to Congress. The circuit should also prepare a public record of any
comments it receives during the review process.
No matter which model is adopted, measures should be put in place to
disincentivize overreliance on court staff. To discourage overdelegation,
Congress should adopt a measure that would discourage courts from relying
on nonjudicial staff instead of asking for Article III resources to meet actual
needs. As part of any judicial-need model, Congress should freeze that
circuit’s ratio of staff attorneys to authorized judgeships at the then-existing
national average whenever (1) a circuit opposes the addition of judges
despite qualifying for an additional judge and (2) Congress determines not
to add judges based on that opposition. That limitation will let courts know
in advance that if they oppose additional judgeships, they may not be eligible
for more nonjudicial resources to absorb their need.
Finally, I should say a word about the political implications of these
proposals. I favor a periodic and standardized process that might lessen the
political stakes of any increase in the federal appellate bench. If Congress
were to revisit this question every five or ten years, then sometimes
Republicans might be in charge, sometimes Democrats, and sometimes we’d
have a divided government.332 It’s also conceivable that, to further lessen the
331

Cf. Arthur D. Hellman, Assessing Judgeship Needs in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Policy
Choices and Process Concerns, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 239, 262, 266–67 (2003) (describing a
“particularly unfortunate” aspect of the Judicial Conference process as its relative secrecy about when a
majority of judges are opposed to adding judges to a circuit, and recommending a public-comment
process and the airing of dissenting views).
332 This argument is consistent with how others have conceptualized the benefits of Supreme Court
term limits. See Adam Chilton, Daniel Epps, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, Designing Supreme Court Term
Limits, 95 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 9), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3788497
[https://perma.cc/KP7S-LSCH] (recognizing that term limits for Supreme Court Justices would produce
regular and predictable turnover at the Court, thereby potentially “reduc[ing]” “the political stakes over
each appointment”); see also Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court:
Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 832–33 (2006) (arguing that a Supreme
Court term-limit proposal “would reduce the stakes of the nomination process and eliminate the
uncertainty that now exists regarding when vacancies will occur”).
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partisan implications of any reform, Congress could set new authorized
judgeships on a time delay, adding one per year over time, thus ensuring that
different political arrangements participate in the process. Although that’s
not been done before with judgeship bills, these are no longer ordinary
political times.
This Section has offered a glimpse at how Congress might address
judicial need at the federal appellate level now and into the future. The next
and final Section offers a brief word on why adding judges matters and how
doing so might ameliorate some of the inequities wrought by the judiciary’s
seeming path dependence to its procedural shortcuts.
D. Why Adding Authorized Judgeships Matters
The systemic deficits and potential disparate impact those deficits may
impose on vulnerable communities are not easy problems to solve. By
focusing here on adding authorized judgeships, I am suggesting that such
additions are at least the beginning of an answer to a complex problem. Even
as judicial workload has eased, the courts have not begun publishing more
cases or hearing more oral argument. That suggests that having more judicial
help may not offer any more procedural opportunities for marginalized
litigants, which is one of the concerns animating this project. Judges might
just take more leisure time instead.
If that’s the case, how will adding judges make any difference? First, in
the aggregate, it appears that there is a correlation between appeals per
judge—at least one measure of court busyness—and the percentage of cases
argued orally and the circuit publication rate. As Figures 9 and 10
demonstrate,333 as the number of appeals filed per judge go up, the rate of
oral argument declines and the rate of unpublication increases. Put
differently, the busier the court, the more likely it is to rely on procedural
shortcuts. That’s not always the case, of course, but the overall trendline
suggests a relationship between the volume of work before each judge and
the opportunities for oral argument and reasoned, precedential decisionmaking.

333 Data here derive from tables B-1 (cases filed), B-10 (oral argument), and B-12 (publication) in
the 2016–2020 editions of Judicial Business. The oral-argument and publication rates are five-year
means, for the five-year period ending on September 30, 2020; the number of appeals filed per judge
reflects total circuit filings divided by authorized judgeships.
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FIGURE 9: ORAL-ARGUMENT RATE AGAINST APPEALS PER JUDGE334
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FIGURE 10: UNPUBLICATION RATE AGAINST APPEALS PER JUDGE
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334 The Pearson correlation values for the data presented in Figure 9 and 10 are 0.39 and 0.59,
respectively, implying moderate and strong correlation. See supra note 232.
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Finally, it may matter whom the President adds to the federal bench. If
judges have grown to like the status quo because it permits them to pay
selective attention to certain cases, it is conceivable that efforts to diversify
the bench through additional judgeships might diversify and expand circuit
priorities at the same time—especially if judges with different professional
backgrounds and experiences are added to the courts.335 Those who come to
the federal bench from private practice may be comfortable with a large
degree of delegation; those who come to the bench from nonprofit
backgrounds, who were public defenders, or who were academics may,
instead, prefer to do the work themselves. It may be no accident, for example,
that the Seventh Circuit has both a high volume of oral argument and a
(relatively) low volume of unpublished decisions given the academic bent of
that court. 336 Moreover, circuit cultures may shift—the so-called “Posner
effect,” for example, on the Seventh Circuit—propelling individual judges
to do more judicial work themselves. 337 Congress should not just add
authorized judgeships, but the President should appoint judges who will
bring a strong service-minded work ethic to the federal bench.
Finally, I recognize that any growth in the federal appellate bench—
even modest, incremental growth like I suggest here—may disrupt the courts
themselves. Not all change may be seen as good change by existing members
of a court. I do not mean my proposals to minimize the real risk that some
courts grow too large, either. But, I suggest, fears over where exactly that
line may be—is a court of twenty-nine too big but a court of seventeen
okay?—should not stop us from considering modest, incremental reform.
When and if any one court grows too large, then Congress can revisit that
question—just as it did when it split the old Fifth Circuit in two.

335 See John P. Collins, Jr., Judging Biden, 75 SMU L. REV. F. 150, 165–70 (2022) (discussing the
professional diversity of recent nominees to federal bench by President Joe Biden). On the value of
diversity more generally, see Written Testimony on the Importance of Judicial Diversity: Hearing Before
the H. Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., & the Internet, 117th Cong. 4–9 (2021) (statement of Maya Sen,
Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University).
336 Notably, Judge Posner famously used only two of his allotted four clerks and did most of the
work himself. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics,
61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19, 25 & n.18 (2005) (describing Judges Posner’s and Easterbrook’s
delegation habits—or lack thereof—and Judge Posner’s failure to hire the full number of allotted clerks).
Judge Diane Wood, likewise, “almost always write[s] . . . [her] own opinions in full.” William
Domnarski, Opinion, Judges Should Write Their Own Opinions, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/opinion/judges-should-write-their-own-opinions.html [https://perma.cc/
2JD5-V69J].
337 See Choi & Gulati, supra note 336, at 25–27 (discussing influences that Judge Posner’s work
ethic may have had on the Seventh Circuit).
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CONCLUSION
Congress bears responsibility for ensuring the even-handed distribution
of federal appellate resources throughout the nation. In an effort to spur
innovation and to reimagine the appellate courts in a time of plenty, not
scarcity, this Article offers several models for doing so. Foremost, it urges
Congress to distribute additional Article III resources even over the objection
of reluctant courts. That reluctance may reflect the values of slim majorities
or entrenched attitudes that have done more harm than good—especially to
vulnerable litigants who more often find their cases resolved through secondtier processes. The federal courts, and the litigants who rely on them, deserve
more than making do with little.
It is entirely possible that the addition of more judges to the federal
bench will produce more appeals—the familiar problem of adding more
lanes to a highway only to create more, rather than less, traffic. I don’t
conceive of that as a “problem” when it comes to administering a judicial
system, however. (Or at least I don’t think it should be added to the “con”
column.) The opportunity to petition a neutral decision-maker for redress for
a constitutional violation or a private injury—including the opportunity to
appeal—is a cornerstone of civilized society. If adding more judges produces
more work for courts, then that suggests the possibility of more access to
justice (as well as the possibility that there had been pent-up demand). This
Article’s central premise is that such a possibility is a far better objective for
the federal appellate courts than maintenance of the status quo.338

338 That premise is also consistent with the stated goals of the federal judiciary itself. One of seven
strategic issues identified by the Judicial Conference in a 2020 strategic plan is “enhancing access to
justice and the judicial process,” and another is “providing justice” by “pursu[ing] improvements in the
delivery of fair and impartial justice on a nationwide basis” and “secur[ing] resources that are sufficient
to enable the judiciary to accomplish its mission.” JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4, 21 (2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federaljudiciary_
strategicplan2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X8W-7FTY].
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APPENDIX A: CIRCUIT-COMPOSITION DATA
This Appendix contains docket-composition data averaged over the last
five years for each of the geographic circuit courts. The rightmost column
notes the standard deviation for each category in each circuit to capture the
variation during that five-year period for each circuit. Cells marked yellow
contain figures that exceed one standard deviation from the nationwide fiveyear means that appear in Table 6. Cells marked red contain figures that
exceed two standard deviations of the nationwide five-year means. All
circuit composition data derive from each table B-1 of the 2016–2020
Judicial Business reports, averaged over the five-year period.339
TABLE A1: D.C. CIRCUIT
D.C. Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean
6.3%
8.2%
24.3%
1.0%
14.9%
0.2%
35.4%

Standard Deviation
1.0%
0.5%
3.4%
0.3%
2.4%
0.1%
5.7%

9.7%

2.4%

TABLE A2: FIRST CIRCUIT
First Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

339
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Five-Year Mean
30.9%
7.6%
5.4%
6.6%
27.9%
2.8%
7.4%

Standard Deviation
1.8%
2.6%
1.0%
1.3%
3.2%
0.7%
1.3%

11.3%

5.7%

See supra note 248 (explaining docket-composition statistics).
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TABLE A3: SECOND CIRCUIT

Second Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean
15.0%
5.1%
5.2%
10.9%
36.1%
1.9%
16.6%

Standard Deviation
1.6%
0.7%
0.6%
1.9%
5.7%
1.1%
0.6%

9.2%

3.7%

TABLE A4: THIRD CIRCUIT
Third Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean
13.6%
9.3%
4.0%
17.7%
28.7%
1.5%
10.4%

Standard Deviation
1.3%
1.8%
0.6%
1.5%
6.0%
0.2%
2.5%

14.8%

6.5%

TABLE A5: FOURTH CIRCUIT
Fourth Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean
24.7%
14.7%
4.8%
16.1%
16.8%
1.1%
4.8%

Standard Deviation
3.4%
2.7%
0.8%
2.2%
1.8%
0.3%
0.8%

17.0%

10.4%
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TABLE A6: FIFTH CIRCUIT
Fifth Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean
31.5%
7.8%
2.5%
18.0%
19.3%
1.0%
7.5%

Standard Deviation
1.5%
1.2%
0.4%
1.4%
2.7%
0.2%
2.8%

12.5%

4.0%

TABLE A7: SIXTH CIRCUIT
Sixth Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean
21.6%
9.8%
3.9%
19.8%
21.1%
0.9%
5.7%

Standard Deviation
2.2%
2.1%
1.0%
1.3%
1.4%
0.2%
0.8%

17.3%

4.3%

TABLE A8: SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Seventh Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications
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Five-Year Mean
17.8%
10.1%
6.0%
22.1%
25.8%
1.3%
3.7%

Standard Deviation
2.3%
1.2%
0.8%
2.2%
3.1%
0.5%
0.7%

13.2%

6.6%
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TABLE A9: EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Eighth Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean
28.2%
11.3%
4.4%
17.5%
18.0%
0.6%
4.8%

Standard Deviation
3.15%
2.1%
0.8%
1.2%
1.3%
0.2%
0.3%

15.2%

7.3%

TABLE A10: NINTH CIRCUIT
Ninth Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean
11.7%
4.9%
5.7%
18.4%
21.2%
1.7%
27.7%

Standard Deviation
0.9%
1.1%
0.7%
0.5%
1.2%
0.3%
1.5%

8.7%

1.7%

TABLE A11: TENTH CIRCUIT
Tenth Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean
20.7%
11.7%
6.3%
15.6%
27.8%
1.2%
5.5%

Standard Deviation
1.5%
3.0%
0.5%
1.4%
1.8%
0.3%
2.4%

11.2%

5.8%
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TABLE A12: ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Eleventh Circuit Appeals
Criminal
U.S. Prisoner Petitions
Other U.S. Civil
Private Prisoner Petitions
Other Private Civil
Bankruptcy
Administrative Agency Appeals
Original Proceedings and
Miscellaneous Applications

Five-Year Mean
21.2%
11.2%
3.6%
17.2%
21.6%
1.2%
5.5%

Standard Deviation
2.3%
2.8%
0.4%
1.7%
3.0%
0.2%
1.5%

18.5%

9.4%

APPENDIX B: AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS OVER TIME
Table B1 reflects the regular and periodic growth in the geographic U.S.
Courts of Appeals over time. Where a negative number appears, it reflects a
redistribution of a judge from one circuit to another (ordinarily when the
latter circuit was created). The percentage of growth reflected in each new
authorized-judgeship bill appears in the rightmost column.
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TABLE B1: GROWTH OF THE GEOGRAPHIC CIRCUITS OVER TIME
Year
1891
1893
1894
1895
1899
1902
1903
1905
1922
1925
1928
1929
1930
1933
1935
1937
1938
1940
1942
1944
1949
1954
1961
1966
1968
1978
1980
1984
1990
2008
2009
Total

D.C.
Cir.

1st
Cir.
2

2d
Cir.
3

3d
Cir.
2

4th
Cir.
2

5th
Cir.
2

6th
Cir.
2

7th
Cir.
2

8th
Cir.
2

9th
Cir.
2

10th
Cir.

11th
Cir.

3
1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1
2
1
–1

1
2

1

4

1
1
1
2

1

1

1

1

1
1

1
2

1
1
1

3
3

2

1

2

1

2

2

1

1
2
2

1
1

3

2
2

1
4

1
2
6
11
–12
2
1

1
2

2
1
2

1
1

1

1

1

1

2

1
1

4
10

1
1

5

2
2

12
4
1

–1
1
11

6

13

14

15

17

16

11

11

29

12

12

Total
Added
19
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
1
2
1
4
4
1
1
2
6
3
1
1
6
3
10
6
13
35
0
24
11
–1
1

Agg.
Total
19
22
23
25
28
29
30
32
33
35
36
40
44
45
46
48
54
57
58
59
65
68
78
84
97
132
132
156
167
166
167

167
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Pct.
Growth
15.8%
4.5%
8.7%
12.0%
3.6%
3.4%
6.7%
3.1%
6.1%
2.9%
11.1%
10.0%
2.3%
2.2%
4.3%
12.5%
5.6%
1.8%
1.7%
10.2%
4.6%
14.7%
7.7%
15.5%
36.1%
0.0%
18.2%
7.1%
–0.6%
0.6%
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